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Liberty analysis under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been enormously inconsistent throughout the history of
constitutional jurisprudence. In construing the meaning of "liberty," the
Supreme Court has utilized a variety of interpretive methods but has never
settled on any one in particular. Liberty jurisprudence is thus unpredict-
able, because the Court chooses among its various methods on a case-by-
case basis. This is not desirable, because it encourages biased and personal
value-based decision-making. There is a better solution. The Court's vari-
ous interpretive methods over the past century reveal certain recurring ob-
jective analytical elements, although these elements are not always used,
and have never been articulated together in a unified liberty test. These
elements should be synthesized into one multi-dimensional interpretive test
to further neutral and enduring liberty jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HE Supreme Court's liberty jurisprudence over the past century
may fairly be called chaotic. The single word "liberty" in the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been defined and
interpreted quite differently in various contexts. The reasons for the in-
consistency can be traced to fundamentally opposing views about federal-
ism and separation of powers that predate the Court's self-appointed
power of ultimate constitutional interpretation.' The only constant in
this area of constitutional adjudication seems to be a heated debate
about the legitimacy of judicial review2 and appropriate interpretive
1. "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Justice Chase declared in
1798 that the Court should actively review legislation and strike down any legislative act
that "cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." Calder v. Bull, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 401 (1798) (Chase, J.). Justice Iredell expressed the judicial restraint
model that continues to animate the Court today: "[T]he authority [of the Court] to de-
clare [legislation] void is of a delicate and awful nature, [and] the Court will never resort to
that authority, but in a clear and urgent case." Id. at 399 (Iredell, J.)
2. For example, Alexander Bickel's characterization of the Court as a "deviant" insti-
tution rests on a conception of democracy dedicated to majority "will," a product of the
legislative and executive branches acting in concert. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (2d ed. 1986). Similarly, "popular constitutionalism" sharply
constricts judicial interpretation of the Constitution in favor of constitutional interpreta-
tion by "the people themselves," i.e., elected officials. See Scott D. Gerber, The Courts, the
Constitution, and the History of Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2008). See also
Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of Constitutional Law?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1249,
1257 (2002) ("[T]he Constitution is an inherently anti-majoritarian document.... Judicial
review enforcing an anti-majoritarian document always will be anti-majoritarian ....
[J]udicial review enforcing it is consistent, and not at odds, with democracy.") See also, e.g.,
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (The Bill of Rights were
intended to withdraw certain rights from the "vicissitudes of political controversy," to put




The Constitution's "spacious" 4 terms such as "liberty" and "due pro-
cess" necessitate interpretation. 5 A variety of interpretive methods pro-
pose to qualify or limit judicial discretion in constitutional litigation,6 and
constitutional scholars continue to seek out "neutral principles" of consti-
tutional adjudication to prevent the Court from functioning as a "naked
power organ."' 7 Concerns about the Court's "naked" power are valid. The
absence of a consistent interpretive method in liberty jurisprudence al-
lows the Court to make decisions "willy nilly ' 8 in accordance with its
Members' personal biases, predilections, or political agendas. Indeed,
concerns about "judicial activism"9 and a loss of judicial "legitimacy" and
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 64 (1980) (noting
that the Court's "overriding virtue" is to protect individuals from government); HENRY
STEELE COMMAGER, LIVING IDEAS IN AMERICA 204 (1964) (the judicial branch must rec-
oncile "majority rule and minority right").
3. The debate over the Court's proper role in checking legislative action continues to
animate contemporary disputes about the established "presumption of constitutionality,"
see, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) and Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), versus what Randy Barnett has termed the "Pre-
sumption of Liberty." See RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1-5 (2004) (arguing that the "judicially redacted" constitution
has created "islands of liberty rights in a sea of governmental power," and that the pre-
sumption of constitutionality should be flipped in favor of a "Presumption of Liberty").
4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. 148 (1968).
5. The Constitution was intended to "endure for ages to come, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs," McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 427
(1819), necessitating interpretation of its "spacious" terms. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-48.
Terms such as "due process" were cast, in the words of Judge Learned Hand, "in such
sweeping terms that their history does not elucidate their contents." LEARNED HAND, THE
BILL OF RIGHTS 30 (1958).
6. These include literalism, originalism, conceptualism, cultural values, process-based
modernism, and open-ended modernism. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Ask-
ing the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62
TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1234-48 (1984). See also William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237 (1986). Some scholars have suggested
fundamental limits to the scope of judicial review based on democratic theory, such as John
Hart Ely's famous process-based theory of judicial review. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 92 (12th ed. 1998). But see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to
me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ap-
plies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedures.").
7. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 12 (1959).
8. Richard A. Fallon, Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278 (2006) (referring to Justice Scalia's use of the term in Vieth
v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 295 (2004)). See also id. at 1285.
9. The term "judicial activism" is not well-defined, but is a term carrying "perjorative
connotation" with several meanings: 1) invalidation of the arguably constitutional actions
of other branches; 2) failure to adhere to precedent; 3) judicial "legislation"; 4) departures
from accepted interpretive methodology; and 5) results-oriented judging. See Keenan D.
Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings Of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441,
1444 (2004). See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (1993).
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"credibility" 10 have become mainstream" and are ubiquitous in the aca-
demic literature and the Court's decisions.
12
The Court has struggled to determine the mandates of due process to
protect individual liberty, and has often engaged in self-critical analysis
relative to its duty to interpret the Constitution. The justices have fre-
quently expressed concern about the need for more objective and consis-
tent liberty interpretation 13 to avoid judicial "roaming at will.' 14
Repeatedly, the Court has attempted to "rein in the subjective ele-
ments"'15 to prevent liberty interpretation from becoming the "idiosyncra-
sies of a merely personal judgment," 16 and to further a "disinterested
inquiry pursued in the spirit of science."1 7 To this end, the Court has
constructed various interpretive methods, which are then engaged irregu-
10. For decades, scholars and judges have argued that the Court must choose a theory
of judicial interpretation to avoid a loss of judicial "legitimacy" or "credibility" that results
when the Court appears to have no boundaries to its interpretive powers. See Chemerin-
sky, supra note 2, at 1253-55.
11. The public at large was drawn into the previously academic debate with the
Court's nadir opinion in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this
year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." Supreme Court jus-
tices have attained celebrity status as the public has become fascinated about their lives, to
obtain clues as to what they may do next, in recognition of the awesome power that they
exercise, and may abuse, relative to Americans' rights and lifestyles. See generally, e.g.,
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007).
Toobin's book spent more than four months on the New York Times best-seller list, and
was named one of the ten best books of the year by the New York Times Book Review,
Time, Newsweek, Fortune, Entertainment Weekly, and the Economist.
12. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 9 (quantifying use of the term "judicial activism").
13. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 756 (1997); Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U.S. 46, 65 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("If the basis of selection is merely
that those provisions of the first eight Amendments are incorporated which commend
themselves to the individual justices as indispensable to the dignity and happiness of a free
man, we are thrown back to a merely subjective test."). "[T]his practice [of recognizing
unenumerated, substantive rights under the Due Process Clause] has neither rested on a
single textual basis nor expressed a consistent theory." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756.
14. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 168-69, 171 (Black, J., concurring). See also,
e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The Court's interpre-
tive methods are "simply an excuse for the Court to substitute its own superficial assess-
ment of the facts and state law for the careful and better informed conclusions of the state
court."). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 808-09 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that the Court's methodology would erode many of the basics of the
federal system).
15. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722. The Casey Court expressed concern about the "popu-
lar misconception" that a change in the Court's membership will result in a fundamental
change to the law, and the "lasting injury" that could result, both in relation to the legiti-
macy of the Court and the entire legal system. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S 833, 864 (1992).
16. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 68 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 544 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The vague contours of the Due Process
Clause do not leave judges at large. We may not draw on our merely personal and private
notions and disregard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function." (quoting
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1952))).
17. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172 ("'[D]ue process of law' requires an evaluation based on a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly
and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims ... [to] reconcil[e] the
needs both of community and of change in a progressive society.").
[Vol. 611560
Elements of Liberty
larly or simply discarded. 18
The lack of consistency in liberty cases is not desirable because similar
claims of liberty may be treated quite differently based on a single change
in the Court's membership 19 or the Court's arguably results-oriented
choice of interpretive methods on a case-by-case basis. Inconsistent deci-
sions can lead to injustice and oppressive uncertainty about liberty
rights.20 Any interpretive method requires judicial value judgment, and
subjective, results-oriented opinions cannot be eradicated entirely.2 '
However, a more objective method that is superior to the current state of
liberty jurisprudence is possible. The key is to create an interpretive test
that mandates judicial review of several objective analytical elements to
neutralize judicial bias and to create more balanced judicial review in all
liberty cases.
This Article is devoted to creating a more objective, judicially manage-
able 22 multi-factor interpretive test to stabilize liberty jurisprudence. The
Court's liberty decisions over the past century reveal that the Court has
in fact reviewed certain objective elements repeatedly in analyzing lib-
erty, despite never imposing a duty on itself to consider these elements in
every case or identifying them together in any articulated, unified inter-
pretive method. The proposed test unifies and distills the Court's various
interpretive methods in liberty cases by "unearthing" common logical and
sociological analytical elements. 23 That is, the elements are identified by
synthesizing existing inconsistent Supreme Court "outputs" for analyzing
18. For example, the penumbral approach to privacy was discarded less than a decade
after it was announced, and the fundamental rights dual standard of review has been en-
gaged inconsistently, with the Court engaging balancing tests or other alternate tests on an
ad hoc basis, sometimes without announcing any standard. See infra Section II.D.
19. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,
44-45 (1989) (When Justice Powell was replaced by Justice Kennedy in 1988, Justice Ken-
nedy supplied the fifth vote to create a conservative majority, and the Court's 1988-1989
term "demonstrated a consistent, conservative working majority on the Court.").
20. "Liberty finds no refuse in a jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years after our deci-
sion holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy...,
that definition of liberty is still questioned." Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (internal citation omit-
ted). See also infra Sections II, IV.
21. "Constitutional decisionmaking is all about value choices .... [C]onstitutional
theory cannot avoid the need for courts to make value choices .... " Chemerinsky, supra
note 6 at 1263.
22. See Fallon, supra note 8 at 1281-83 (noting that the age requirement for presidency
is itself a clear, judicially manageable standard, whereas vague constitutional clauses such
as "equal protection" require interpretation and therefore need interpretive limits).
23. See Laurence H. Tribe, Reflections on Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
483, 489, 492 (2007). Tribe refers to jurisprudential superstructures capable of enveloping
and sheltering individuals and their relationships as "geodesic domes." Id. at 489. This is a
fair description of liberty jurisprudence as a whole, provided that the domes have cracks
and holes, such that certain unusual individuals, such as Michael H., get soaked while the
majority stays dry. The proposed method is more like Tribe's "geological" model because
it involves "digging beneath a recognized enumerated right or set of rights so as to unearth
the logical or sociological presuppositions of those rights, the postulates they should be
understood to reflect, or the underlying (typically more substantive) rights without which
the rights enumerated (often more procedural or quasi-procedural in cast) would be ren-
dered incoherent or largely purposeless." Id. at 496.
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vague constitutional norms.24 The proposed six element interpretive test
is thus the product of an objective review of the "history and tradition" of
Supreme Court liberty jurisprudence itself.
The largely objective elements of liberty proposed herein provide a de-
sirable "check" on the Court's otherwise unfettered reliance on its poten-
tially agenda-driven rendition of "history and tradition" as the sole
criterion for interpreting liberty.2 5 The proposed elements are: 1) history
and tradition; 2) the nature of the right (personal autonomy, intellectual
freedom, and intimacy); 3) bodily integrity (physical invasion, pain, or
restraint); 4) state laws; 5) legislative facts; and 6) foreign/international
law. The proposed test mandates consideration of each element to en-
courage impartial and balanced liberty analysis and to minimize the risk
of liberty interpretation that is inconsistent with Americans' privacy ex-
pectations, scientific data, and global concepts of freedom. If adopted,
this multi-factor interpretive test should lead to more enduring liberty
jurisprudence, because requiring consideration of objective elements -
such as medical and social facts, where relevant - limit the impact of the
justices' personal or moral convictions.
Section II demonstrates the Court's history of inconsistent liberty anal-
ysis. Section III identifies six analytical elements that the Court has ar-
ticulated and relied on repeatedly in liberty jurisprudence. The danger of
inconsistent methods in liberty cases is demonstrated in Section IV by
comparing Supreme Court precedent reaching opposite conclusions in
similar cases within a short time frame. In Section V, the method pro-
posed in this Article is illustrated by analyzing a substantive due process
challenge to proposed legislation to mandate human papillomavirus
(HPV) vaccine for eleven and twelve-year-old girls. This Article con-
cludes that the Court, having conferred upon itself ultimate constitutional
interpretive power, is the appropriate body to place a check on this power
by adopting the proposed test to enhance objective, principled liberty
interpretation.
24. See Fallon, supra note 8, at 1283. A judicially manageable standard is an "output"
when a court successfully devises a test that can thereafter be used to implement constitu-
tional rights that are not themselves judicially manageable standards, such as the right of
equal protection. The standard proposed herein synthesizes nearly a century of due process
"outputs" to create an output-based "input" for liberty analysis that itself would become
an "output" if adopted by a court.
25. See infra Section II. The Court has looked to "history and tradition" exclusively or
as part of a broader analysis in liberty cases to determine whether a claimed right is "fun-
damental." See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) ("Our estab-
lished method of substantive-due-process analysis . . . [begins with identifying] those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition'...." (emphasis added; citations omitted)). However, the justices' ren-
dition of "history" has been quite subjective at times, vulnerable to the justices' results-
oriented characterization of the relevant history, rendering "history and tradition" per se
an inadequate interpretive method. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 568-73
(2003) (criticizing the inaccurate rendition of history in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)). See also infra Section III.
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II. INCONSISTENT DEFINITIONS OF "LIBERTY"
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sen-
sations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men.
26
In a Constitution for free people, there can be no doubt that the mean-
ing of "liberty" must be broad indeed.27
The conceptual breadth of "liberty" necessitates interpretation. This
Section will demonstrate the Court's inconsistent liberty analysis by refer-
ence to the incorporation cases, procedural due process cases, criminal
procedure cases involving bodily integrity, and substantive due process
cases. The following sub-sections exemplify, but by no means exhaust,
the Court's inconsistent liberty analysis. 28
A. INCORPORATION CASES
After the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, the Court was called
upon to define "liberty" set forth therein and to determine the "due pro-
cess" limits to state action. Whether and to what extent the Bill of Rights
would be incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the subject of the incorporation debate.29
Early definitions of liberty include whether the claimed right "is of
such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions, '''30 is such that "neither liberty nor justice
would exist if [it] were sacrificed," 31 or is "so rooted in the tradition and
26. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27. Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
28. For example, the Court has employed very different tests for substantive due pro-
cess deprivations of liberty depending on whether the deprivation results from executive or
legislative action. The "shocks the conscience" standard applies to executive action,
whereas liberty claims based on legislative action are governed by Washington v. Gluck-
sberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), and other state law-based substantive due process cases. See
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998); see also infra Section lI.D. Due
process cases based on property deprivation have produced a variety of standards as well.
See generally, e.g., State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 548 U.S. 408 (2003) (depriva-
tion of property/excessive punitive damages awards authorized by state law); BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliances Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443
(1993). See also David H. Armistead, Substantive Due Process Limits on Public Officials'
Power to Terminate State-Created Property Interests," 29 GA. L. REv. 769 (1995).
29. For a discussion of the incorporation debate, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 150 n.14 (1968).
30. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932). The Court relied upon the historical
practice in America of providing counsel for criminal defendants, particularly in capital
murder cases involving ignorant and illiterate youthful defendants, to find that the right of
counsel in such cases is "fundamental [in] nature," such that failing to provide counsel
could result in "judicial murder." Id. at 73.
31. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
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conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental, '32 and there-
fore "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. ' 33 These vague defini-
tions left the Court to decide on a case-by-case basis whether state action
that would violate the Bill of Rights if perpetrated by the federal govern-
ment also violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of liberty.
34
The Court often looked to the Bill of Rights and historical English and
American practices to determine which liberties were "fundamental,"
and therefore deserving of protection from state infringement.35 In some
cases, the Court sought factual "objective criteria," 36 or "matters of re-
corded history" 37 to construct a "test ... to determine whether due pro-
cess of law has been accorded in given instances. '38 The "objective"
criteria have included American historical practices, including the ex-
isting laws in the various states,39 foreign law,40 and the Framers' intent.
41
In other cases, the Court simply declared that particular provisions con-
tained in the Bill of Rights were "in" or "out" of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Liberty Clause42 based on an analysis of whether a "fair and
enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them, '43 or
whether failing to apply the federal right to the states would subject citi-
zens to "a hardship so acute and shocking that our policy will not endure
it.,"44
At times, the Court held that certain provisions of the Bill of Rights
create a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment, but in a dif-
ferent, looser, "watered down, subjective version, '45 so that a state actor
may constitutionally deny a liberty interest by means that would not sat-
32. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
33. See id. at 326 (citations omitted). See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49 (listing a
variety of tests for deciding whether a provision of the Bill of Rights is also protected
against state action by the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 322 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1947).
35. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49. In this case, the Court traced the history of jury
trials from the Magna Carta, to English practice, to the "objective criteria" comprised of
the existing laws and practices in America, noting that Louisiana was the only state that
subjected suspects to bench trials where the punishment exceeds one year in jail. Id. at 161.
36. Id. at 161 (referring to precedent as "objective criteria").
37. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64 (1932).
38. Id. at 65.
39. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148-49.
40. The Palko Court relied in part on the fact that the countries in Continental Europe
do not confer the right against double jeopardy on their citizens, noting that double jeop-
ardy and compulsory self-incrimination are allowed by Roman law and French law. Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937).
41. The Powell Court stated: "One test which has been applied to determine whether
due process of law has been accorded in given instances is to ascertain what were the
settled usages and modes of proceeding under the common and statute law of England
before the Declaration of Independence .. " Powell, 287 U.S. at 65.
42. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (holding that double jeopardy is not unconstitutional if per-
petrated by a state).
44. Id. at 328.
45. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (quoting Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (dissenting opinion)). See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796
(1969) (The Court must review double jeopardy claims by Fifth Amendment standards, not
by the "watered-down standard enunciated in Palko.").
[Vol. 611564
Elements of Liberty
isfy due process under the relevant Bill of Rights provision if perpetrated
by a federal actor. More frequently, the Court has required the same due
process under state and federal law, testing state law "jot-for-jot" in ac-
cordance with the federal right,46 because it would be "incongruous to
have different standards determine the validity of a claim of privilege
based on the same feared prosecution, depending on whether the claim
was asserted in a state or federal court. '47
As a result of the Court's vague and inconsistent methods of defining
liberty, decisions in incorporation cases have been inconsistent. For ex-
ample, the Court in Palko v. Connecticut48 found that liberty's protection
did not encompass preventing a state from subjecting a criminal defen-
dant to double jeopardy even though the same conduct would violate the
Fifth Amendment if perpetrated by the federal government.4 9 The Court
rejected a general rule of incorporation on grounds of federalism, 50 and
found that Connecticut's procedural choice was not "so acute and shock-
ing" to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.51 Similarly, in Adamson v.
California,52 liberty was interpreted not to include the right to prevent a
prosecutor from commenting on an accused's failure to testify, even
though that right was secured by the Bill of Rights as against the federal
government and had already been adopted by most states.53 The Adam-
son Court relied in part on federalism, 54 holding that a state may devise
methods to help juries determine truth in accordance with its own ideas
of efficient criminal justice administration. 55
Similarly, in Williams v. Florida,56 the Court decided that the Sixth
Amendment's mandate of a unanimous verdict by a twelve-member jury
was not incorporated to the states, so that in state trials, the jury may be
comprised of fewer jurors, and the verdict need not be unanimous. 57 In
deciding whether due process under state law requires a unanimous
twelve-member jury, the Court traced the history of the twelve-member
jury, and found that it may have been grounded in biblical numbers 58 but
was retained throughout the centuries in Europe by "historical acci-
46. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 181 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
47. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11.
48. 302 U.S. 319 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
49. See Palko, 302 U.S. at 322-23.
50. Id. at 323.
51. Id. at 328.
52. 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
53. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 55.
54. The Court stated that states are "free to abridge, within the limits of the due pro-
cess clause, the privileges and immunities flowing from state citizenship. This reading [is]
... a natural and logical interpretation. It accords with the constitutional doctrine of feder-
alism ... [to preserve] the balance between national and state power." Id. at 52-53.
55. Id. at 53-57.
56. 339 U.S. 78 (1970).
57. Williams, 399 U.S. at 102. See also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); John-
son v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
58. Williams, 399 U.S. at 86-90 (citing Coke's explanation that the number twelve is
utilized in holy writ, such as twelve apostles).
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dent, '59 as opposed to being integral to a fair trial. The Court relied on
social science experiments demonstrating that there was "no discernible
difference between the results reached by two different-sized juries," 60
dispelling the concept that a state defendant was disadvantaged by having
less jurors.61 The Court also relied on state law precedent, noting that the
states have consistently required a twelve-member jury in death penalty
cases only, reflecting an "implicit recognition of the value of the larger
body as a means of legitimizing society's decision to impose the death
penalty." 62
Later, during an era in which civil liberties were greatly expanded,
63
the Court overruled some of these decisions to conform the Fourteenth
Amendment analysis to the Bill of Rights analysis. 64 In overruling Palko
v. Connecticut, the Court in Benton v. Maryland65 relied on legal prece-
dent and the "origins" of the claimed liberties, by tracing the right against
double jeopardy to "Greek and Roman times,... established in the com-
mon law of England long before the Nation's independence," and also
relied on the fact that every state prohibited double jeopardy in some
form.66 Similarly, the Court overruled Adamson v. California in Malloy
v. Hogan,67 relying on the Framers' intent 68 in enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment and the "shift" in Supreme Court jurisprudence to interpret
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights consistent with cases inter-
preting the Bill of Rights.69
Applying provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states identically as
they are applied to the federal government enhances consistency between
federal and state due process requirements, but has been criticized as re-
sulting from the subjective viewpoints of the justices and as an assault on
federalism.70 However, other than the requirements of a twelve-member
59. Id. at 89, 102.
60. Id. at 101-02.
61. The argument was that the greater the number of jurors, the greater the chances
that one will vote to acquit, preventing conviction. Id. at 101-02.
62. Id. at 103.
63. During the Vinson Court (June 24, 1946 to September 8, 1953) and Warren Court
(October 5, 1953 to June 23, 1969), civil liberties were defined liberally and expanded,
which included incorporating many provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 482-83 (2d ed. 2002).
64. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-96 (1969).
65. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
66. Id. at 794-95.
67. 328 U.S. 1 (1964).
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 11. See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (adopting exclusionary rule
for federal prosecutions that applied to state prosecutions). The provisions requiring iden-
tical enforcement include First Amendment guarantees, the Fourth Amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.
Malloy, 378 U.S. at 11. See also, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1985).
70. See, e.g., Malloy, 378 U.S. at 16-17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The ultimate result of
the Court's decision to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the Fourteenth Amendment in
identical form is to create "compelled uniformity, which is inconsistent with the purpose of
our federal system and which is achieved either by encroachment on the States' sovereign
powers or by dilution in federal law enforcement of the specific protections found in the
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jury and unanimous verdicts, it is now settled that liberty for state law
purposes is defined by reference to the Bill of Rights and opinions inter-
preting its limits to federal power.
B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CASES
Before determining what procedures are constitutionally required by
the Due Process Clause, courts must decide whether a deprivation of life,
liberty, or property has occurred. The Court has defined liberty for proce-
dural due process purposes in two general ways. In some cases, the Court
has defined liberty based on the importance of the individual interest at
stake. For example, in Roth v. Board of Regents, the Court defined lib-
erty as "those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.171 In other cases, the Court looked to
expectations created by state law to determine whether the state law cre-
ated a liberty interest.
The inconsistent liberty analysis in procedural due process cases may
be exemplified best by the prisoners' rights cases, where the Court has
defined liberty by reference to one or both of the above-referenced meth-
ods over the past forty years. In the early 1970s, the Court analyzed pris-
oners' liberty rights by reference to the Due Process Clause based on the
"nature" of the alleged deprivation and the importance of the claimed
right to the prisoner. For example, in Morrissey v. Brewer, the Court de-
termined that revocation of parole implicates a liberty interest because of
its impact the parolee's life, including the ability to be employed and to
associate with friends and family.72
In 1974, the Court in Wolff v. McDonnell 3 decided that liberty inter-
ests may be created by state laws creating expectations, the deprivation of
which requires compliance with procedural due process. The Wolff Court
determined that a liberty interest in "good time" credits was "a statutory
creation of the state," not based on the Due Process Clause.74 Since the
loss of good time credits meant longer incarceration, and the bases for
revoking good time credits were clearly spelled out by state law, the state
law created a liberty interest requiring due process before good time
Bill of Rights."). See also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Fortas, J., con-
curring) (noting that our Constitution sets up a federal union, not a monolith).
71. 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
72. 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). The Court stated that parole "includes many of the core
values of unqualified liberty [such that] its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the pa-
rolee and often on others." Id. at 482, alluding to the "grievous loss" language of Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (concluding that a revocation of
probation similarly implicates a liberty interest).
73. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
74. Id. at 557-58. See also Greenholz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1 (1979) (clarifying that state law must be sufficiently clear to create entitlements to
parole, not mere hope of parole). See also Ky. Dept. of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454
(1989).
2008] 1567
1568 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61
credits could be revoked. 75 Similarly, the Court found a liberty interest in
discretionary parole in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Cor-
rectional Complex,76 because state law created parole opportunities and
provided only four bases requiring specific findings to deny parole. The
Court departed from its prior Due Process Clause-based liberty analysis
in other cases as well, yet occasionally reverted to a Due Process Clause
analysis. 77
In 1995, the Court in Sandin v. Conner78 decided that in defining lib-
erty, its shift from the nature of the deprivation to expectations created
by state law had spurred excessive liberty claims.79 The relatively con-
servative Sandin Court80 restricted the definition of liberty under both
existing methods: to establish a liberty interest, a prisoner must show ei-
ther that the state action increased the adverse consequences to the in-
mate in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the
Due Process Clause of its own force, or that state law created a liberty
interest in freedom from restraint that, if deprived, "imposes atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." 81
The Court's decisions regarding liberty rights of public school students
provide another example of inconsistency in procedural due process
cases. In Goss v. Lopez, the Court found that students have a liberty
interest in "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity, ' 82 and that
charges of misconduct resulting in suspension or expulsion "could seri-
ously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their
teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education
and employment."'83 Just two years later, the Court in Ingraham v. Wright
75. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556-58. The Court also stated that a person's liberty is equally
protected whether it arises from the Due Process Clause or state law. Id. at 558.
76. 442 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1979).
77. For example, the Court found that the loss of freedom involved in transferring a
prisoner from a minimum to maximum security facility was insufficient for a finding of
liberty deprivation under the Due Process Clause per se, such that any liberty interest in
not being transferred must be derived from state or federal statutory language creating
such a liberty interest. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976). Yet, the Court found a Due
Process Clause-based liberty interest in avoiding transfer from a prison to a mental institu-
tion because of the likelihood of mandatory drug treatment and potential for social
stigma. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). The Vitek Court also found a liberty interest
based on statutory language. Id. See also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (find-
ing a Due Process Clause-based liberty right to avoid involuntary administration of anti-
psychotic drugs).
78. 515 U.S. 472, 481 (1995).
79. Among other things, "[b]y shifting the focus of the liberty interest inquiry to one
based on the language of a particular regulation, and not the nature of the deprivation, the
Court encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which
to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges." Id. at 481. This also led to in-
creased federal court involvement with day to day prison operations. Id. at 483.
80. See supra note 20.
81. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84 (finding that discipline in the form of segregated con-
finement for 30 days did not implicate a liberty interest requiring due process prior to its
imposition).
82. 419 U.S. 565, 575 (1975). But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding that
harm to reputation in and of itself is not a liberty deprivation).
83. Id. at 574.
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found a liberty interest in avoiding school corporal punishment, described
as "licks with a paddle while being held over a table in the principal's
office."'84 The Ingraham Court found a liberty interest based on the physi-
cal restraint involved and the "infliction of appreciable pain."'85 In addi-
tion, the Goss v. Lopez Court found that a student's liberty right is
violated in the absence of notice and a hearing prior to suspension or
expulsion,8 6 whereas the Ingraham Court held that no process is due
prior to administering corporal punishment because state tort remedies
are available post facto.87
C. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES INVOLVING BODILY INTEGRITY
The Court has been quite inconsistent in defining the liberty interest at
stake when a state actor invades a suspect's privacy by physically pene-
trating his body without his consent to procure evidence of criminal activ-
ity. In Rochin v. California,8 8 the Court defined liberty in terms of
whether the government action "offend[s] those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peo-
ples[,]. . .those personal immunities which ... are so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental," 89 to
avoid offending the "community's sense of fair play and decency" 90 or
"shocking the conscience" of the Court. 91 The Court looked to "consid-
erations deeply rooted in reason" such as "the maxims, rules, and princi-
ples" of traditional decisions, to avoid subjectivity. 92 The Rochin Court
found that force-pumping a suspect's stomach to obtain evidence of mor-
phine possession implicated a liberty interest in bodily integrity akin to
the liberty interest in avoiding coerced confessions, 93 because it was "too
close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional
differentiation." 94
Fourteen years later, the Court changed its method for defining liberty
in Schmerber v. California,95 where the state obtained evidence of drunk
driving by extracting blood from the suspect's body against his will. The
84. 430 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).
85. Id. at 674. The Court's departure from a reputation-based liberty interest may be
due to the fact that Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), was decided in the session between
Goss and Ingraham.
86. Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.
87. Ingraham, 430 U.S at 676.
88. 342 US. 165, 169 (1952).
89. Id. at 169 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
90. Id. at 173. Douglas balked at this definition based on a review of state laws show-
ing that only four states would exclude evidence obtained in this manner, undermining the
majority's position that forced stomach pumping to obtain evidence violates the "decencies
of civilized conduct." Id. at 177-78 (Douglas, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 172.
92. Id. at 171.
93. Id. at 173-74.
94. Id. at 172. Today, Rochin would be analyzed as a Fourth Amendment case. See
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 173 (1994); Graham v. O'Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-95
(1989).
95. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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Court defined liberty by reference to cases interpreting specific provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights that were implicated by the facts, i.e., the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Schmerber. The Schmerber Court de-
fined liberty under the Fourth Amendment as protecting "personal pri-
vacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State... against
arbitrary intrusion by the police ... basic to a free society."' 96 Based on
this definition, the Court found that compulsory blood tests constitute a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment, implicating a liberty interest.97
The Court then applied the Fourth Amendment balancing test to find
that the state's need for evidence outweighed the suspect's liberty inter-
est, relying on medical evidence concerning minimal health risks of blood
extraction and the prompt loss of evidence due to the speed of alcohol
metabolism. 98
Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the Court stated that liberty has been
defined by reference to "the respect the government - state or federal -
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens ... to respect the
inviolability of the human personality," but found that the privilege has
been limited to the "cruel, simple expedient" of a forced confession.99
Based on "[h]istory and a long line of authorities,"' 00 the Court held that
the Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination of a "testimonial
or communicative nature,"10 1 not withdrawal of blood, which constitutes
"real or physical evidence. 102 Admitting the blood test results into evi-
dence therefore did not implicate a liberty interest under the Fifth
Amendment.10 3
The Court modified its method of interpreting liberty again in Winston
v. Lee,104 another physically invasive evidence-production case, where
the Court focused on the suspect's "expectation of privacy," including the
"right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."' 0 5 Based on this broad definition, the
Court found that surgically removing a bullet from a suspect's body
against his will implicates a liberty interest, because "compelled surgical
intrusion implicates expectations of privacy and security. ' 10 6 Applying
the Fourth Amendment balancing test, the Court found that "extensive
probing and retracting of muscle tissue," risks of infection, and other "un-
certain" medical risks tipped the balance in favor of the suspect, particu-
96. Id. at 767.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 769-72.
99. Id. at 762-63.
100. Id. The Court also referred to this analytical basis as "history and precedent." Id.
at 767. The Court distinguished non-communicative evidence such as lie detector test re-
sults since they are "directed to eliciting responses which are essentially testimonial." Id.
at 764.
101. Id. at 761.
102. Id. at 764.
103. Id.
104. 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985)
105. Id. at 758 (1985) (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 759.
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larly since the state had eyewitness evidence of the suspect's guilt,
rendering the physical evidence less critical to the state's case. 10 7
D. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CASES
The Supreme Court originally defined liberty for Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process purposes in Meyer v. Nebraska:0 8
[L]iberty ... denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but
also the right of the individual to contract, engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, es-
tablish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privi-
leges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men. 10 9
The Meyer Court struck down a state law prohibiting children who had
not yet passed the eighth grade from learning a foreign language, voicing
concern about the irreversible lost intellectual opportunity: "It is well
known that proficiency in a foreign language seldom comes to one not
instructed at an early age." 110 Two years later, the Court struck down a
law prohibiting private schooling in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,"' holding that liberty includes the right
of parents to control their children's educational upbringing, and that a
parent's choice to send a child to private school was constitutionally pro-
tected, because private schooling is not inherently harmful.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,112 the Court found that "penumbras" or
"zones of privacy" formed by emanations of enumerated rights which
"help give them life and substance" 1 3 preclude a state from criminalizing
spouses' use of contraceptives. The Court defined liberty broadly to pro-
scribe "government invasions of the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life,"' 14 and interference with "personal rights that are funda-
107. Id. at 761-63.
108. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
109. Id. at 399.
110. Id. at 403.
111. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court struck down a state
law that required all children to attend public schools between the ages of eight and six-
teen, because it infringed on the parents' prerogatives regarding their children's education.
112. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The "principle" of Meyer and Pierce was specifically reaf-
firmed. Id. at 483.
113. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 516-22 (1961)(Douglas, J., dissenting)). Douglas had been on the Court at the time Rochin was decided
and had lived through the Lochner Era. He was apparently committed to avoiding sub-
stantive due process analysis as a way of avoiding Lochner Era philosophy. See Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167 (1973) (Stewart, J. concurring) ("In view of what had been so
recently said in [Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), which sounded the death knell of
substantive due process], the Court's opinion in Griswold understandably did its best to
avoid reliance on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the ground for
its decision."). Justice Douglas therefore relied on a right of privacy implicit in many of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, including the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
114. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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mental [and] so rooted in the conscience of our people to be ranked as
fundamental,"' 1 5 relying on language from the incorporation cases.
16
Roe v. Wade developed liberty analysis enormously by providing some
objective elements for defining "fundamental rights" grounded in "his-
tory and tradition," at least in the context of abortion and presumably
other medical contexts. In defining a woman's right to abortion as "fun-
damental," the Court looked to "medical and medical-legal history,"
'
"17
what "history reveals about man's attitude toward the abortion procedure
over the centuries,"' 1 8 and the "history of abortion"" 9 with an open, ob-
jective mind "free of emotion and predilection.' 120 The Court considered
numerous legislative facts, including the physical and mental health im-
pact of forced motherhood, and the psychological harm that can result
from a "distressful life and future," including the "stigma of unwed
motherhood.' 21
The Court declared that "history and tradition" is the cornerstone of
substantive due process liberty analysis in Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land.122 In this case, the Court defined liberty to include living with ex-
tended family members because the "sanctity of the family" is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," and "[i]t is through the fam-
ily that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural."'123 The Court struck down a zoning ordinance that
defined family in reliance on a Caucasian social construct of "family,"
which prevented extended family members from living together for popu-
115. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Court relied on the incorporation cases, as well as Meyer and Pierce, inter alia.
116. Id. at 487, 493 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan concurred, but on substantive
due process grounds. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring; citations omitted). Justice
Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, relied on the Ninth
Amendment as textual authority to protect non-textual rights such as privacy. Id. at 486.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, finding that no constitutional provision
authorized the Court to make "natural law," generalized findings of arbitrariness to strike
down state laws, and that such an interpretation was an improper "transfer" of power from
the legislature to the judiciary. See id at 508-513, 525-526 (Black, J., dissenting). See also id
at 527-531 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
117. Roe, 410 U.S. at 117.
118. Id. at 117.
119. Id. at 129. Contemporary history supported criminalizing abortion, so the Court
traced history as far back as the Persian Empire and Roman Era to find support for a
"right" of abortion. Id. at 130. Justice Blackman explained that abortion was available in
colonial America from 1620 to the Civil War, and that criminalizing abortion was relatively
new in legal history. Ironically, the Court later announced that recent history (the past half
century) is the most relevant in analyzing liberty rights, demonstrating how subjective the
relevant "history and tradition" can be. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116.
121. Id. at 153.
122. 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). The Court cited Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman
and his concurrence in Griswold v. Connecticut in defining fundamental rights as those
rooted in "history and tradition." Id. at 501.
123. The Court held that the tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grand-
parents, sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable
as the nuclear family. Id. at 504.
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lation density control purposes. 124 The Court relied in part on census re-
ports and other contemporary social data to support its broader
definition of "family," 125 and recognized the importance of progressive
and pluralistic definitions of liberty based on improvements in social un-
derstanding, that "tradition is a living thing," and that American legal
precedent supports breaking tradition where necessary to further social
justice. 126
By 1986, a number of fundamental rights had been constructed based
on broad definitions of liberty.1 27 In Bowers v. Hardwick,128 a majority of
the Court narrowed the definition of liberty relative to gay men's privacy
rights by framing the issue presented as "whether the Federal Constitu-
tion confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy
and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make such
conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.' 1 29 The Court's
narrow issue-framing choice foretold its conclusion, since a "right of sod-
omy" could not be characterized as "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, '130 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' '131
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,132 the
Court returned to a more abstract definition of "liberty" in reaffirming
the right of abortion, and articulated a number of elements relevant to
liberty interpretation. The Court stated that our laws and tradition afford
constitutional protection to "personal decisions" relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and educa-
tion, and that the state cannot enter the "private realm of family life" or
interfere with the "most intimate and personal choices a person may
124. Id. at 504. The concurring opinion by Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
pointed out the disparate racial impact this ordinance would have on black families, who
much more frequently lived in extended families. Id. at 510 n.9.
125. Id. at 505 n.14 (reviewing census data, inter alia). See also id. at 509-10 nn.6-9(Brennan, J., concurring) (reviewing race data on families' composition, including the fact
that 48% of households with an elderly black woman as head of household included chil-
dren who were not her offspring, whereas only 10% of similar white households contained
children not the offspring of the head of household).
126. Historical teachings include "traditions from which it developed as well as the tra-
ditions from which it broke..." Id. at 501 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-543
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
127. The fundamental rights recognized at this time were categorized as: the right to
control one's children's upbringing and education; the right to family autonomy; the right
to procreate; the right to marry; the right to obtain contraception; and the right to obtain
an abortion. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986).
128. In this 5-4 decision, the dissent vehemently disagreed with the majority's choice of
framing the issue. See id. at 200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority has distorted
the question this case presents.").
129. Id. at 190.
130. Id. at 191-92 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
131. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503). The Court found that none of the
fundamental rights recognized at that time (childrearing, education, procreation, marriage)
bore any resemblance to the claimed fundamental right of sodomy. Id. at 190. The Court
therefore applied rational basis review, finding that the law was rationally related to Geor-
gia's "notions of morality." Id. at 196.
132. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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make in a lifetime." 133 The Court focused on individuals' interest in per-
sonal autonomy, including choice of beliefs, reminiscent of the Meyer
Court's protection of intellectual and educational autonomy. 134 Other el-
ements the Court considered were: bodily integrity, including the physical
and emotional pain involved with forced motherhood; 135 medical facts
relevant to the liberty interest at stake;136 expert witnesses' opinions
about the real-life consequences of the challenged provisions; 137 individ-
ual or societal reliance on the established right of abortion;138 and respect
for stare decisis tempered by the need to reverse prior rulings when they
"come to be seen so clearly as error."'1 39 The Casey Court engaged a
multi-dimensional analysis to support its "principled ' 140 decision in an
apparent recognition of the need for more objective judicial review.
In Washington v. Glucksberg,'41 the Court returned to a narrow defini-
tion of liberty, framing the issue as whether there is a fundamental right
to assisted suicide.142 The Court relied on the fact that forty-four states
and relevant European jurisdictions criminalize assisted suicide, noting
that "[tihe primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus
is ... the pattern of enacted laws,"'1 43 and it is the "norm among western
133. Id. at 851.
134. Id. The Court stated: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own con-
cept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State." Justice Stevens put it this way: "Our whole constitutional heri-
tage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds." Id. at
915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557, 565 (1969)).
135. Id. at 852-53.
136. Id. at 860 ("We have seen how time has overtaken some of Roe's factual assump-
tions: advances in maternal health care . . . and advances in neonatal care have advanced
viability .. "). See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923-29 (relying extensively on
medical evidence to conclude that Nebraska's partial birth abortion law created an "undue
burden" on the right of abortion).
137. Id. at 888-92 (citing studies conducted by the American Medical Association and
other studies exposing facts about family violence).
138. Id. at 855-56.
139. Id. at 854. The Court referred to West Coast Hotel and Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, which overruled Lochner v. New York and Plessy v. Ferguson, respectively, because
the social facts had changed. See id. at 861-64. In Casey, the rejected social facts include the
common law understanding of a woman's role in the family and the principle that women
had no legal existence separate from her husband. Id. at 896-97.
140. The Court used the term "principle(s)" or "principled" twelve times in just two
pages of its decision while discussing its liberty analysis methodology. Id. at 865-66. The
Court was clearly seeking some concrete standards to support its decision regarding this
politically hot topic, in recognition that its legitimacy was at stake and could be under-
mined by frequent reversal of precedent. Id. at 867 ("[Tbo overrule under fire in the ab-
sence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the
Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.").
141. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
142. The Court stated that the "first issue to be resolved is whether there is a liberty
interest in determining the time and manner of one's death." Id. at 722. The Court's choice
of issue-framing restricted the definition of liberty "to rein in the subjective elements that
are necessarily present in due-process judicial review." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
143. Id. at 711 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989)).
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democracies." 144 Therefore, the claimed right to assisted suicide has no
"place in our Nation's traditions. ' 145
The Court engaged a more abstract definition of liberty once again in
Lawrence v. Texas, and re-framed the Bowers issue as "whether the peti-
tioners were free as adults to engage in [sodomy] in the exercise of their
liberty. ' 146 Liberty was defined to include freedom of thought, belief, ex-
pression, and certain intimate conduct. 147 The Texas sodomy law was
found to invade the "most private" human conduct in the "most private"
of places, the home, 148 leading the Court to conclude that the Bowers
decision "failed to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake."1 49 The
Lawrence Court did not interpret liberty by relying solely on history and
tradition; the Court acknowledged social condemnation of sodomy and
"respect for the traditional family," but stated that its obligation was to
"define the liberty for all, not mandate our own moral code." 150
In defining liberty to include protection of sodomy, the Court relied on
objective facts, such as the fact that there is no longstanding precedent
criminalizing sodomy per se and the fact that early American sodomy
laws were directed at non-procreative sex, not homosexuality. 51 The
Court also relied on the state law trend to abolish criminal sodomy 152 and
a "history of non-enforcement" of existing sodomy laws, and announced
that the laws of the past half-century are the most relevant in determining
"history and tradition. '153 In addition, history and tradition are a starting
point, but not the ending point, of liberty analysis:154 stare decisis is "not
an inexorable command, ' 155 and where precedent has sustained "serious
erosion, 1 156 criticism from "other sources," such as sentiment expressed
by state law and foreign law, may trump precedent in liberty interpreta-
144. Id. at 711 n.8. The Court traced the history of legal prohibitions from the early
thirteenth century. Id. at 711-19.
145. Id. at 723.
146. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003).
147. Id. at 562.
148. Id. at 567.
149. Id. at 567. The Court stated: "To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right
to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it
would demean a married couple were it to be said that marriage is just about the right to
have sexual intercourse." Id.
150. Id. at 571.
151. Id. at 568. The Court stated: "Far from possessing 'ancient roots,' American laws
targeting same-sex couples did not develop until the last third of the 20th century." Id. at
570.
152. Id. at 573 (citations omitted). The Court stated that before 1961, all 50 states had
outlawed sodomy, that at the time Bowers was decided, 24 states and the District of Co-
lumbia had laws prohibiting sodomy, but that at the time Lawrence was decided, that num-
ber had been reduced to 13. Id.
153. Id. at 571-72.
154. Id. at 572 (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 577-78 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 572. Justice Scalia argued that Roe and Casey had been "eroded" by Gluck-
sberg's holding that only fundamental rights deeply rooted in the country's history and




tion. 157 The Court clarified that Bowers (unlike Roe v. Wade) had not
induced "individual or societal reliance" that could mitigate against re-
versal because reversal would create "uncertainty" in the law.' 58 In addi-
tion, the stigma and potential for discrimination resulting from violation
of the Texas criminal statute animated the Court: the sodomy law "de-
means the lives of homosexuals," and is an "invitation to subject homo-
sexual persons to discrimination." 159
III. ELEMENTS OF LIBERTY ANALYSIS DERIVED FROM
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
[A] decision without principled justification [is] no judicial act at all.
• .. [T]he justification claimed must be beyond dispute. . . grounded
truly in principle, not as compromises with social and political
pressures .... 160
Although the Court has created some standards for interpreting lib-
erty, as set forth in Section II, it has more frequently vacillated among
various interpretive methods, and has expanded and retracted the mean-
ing of liberty throughout the past century. However, the Court has con-
sidered certain elements repeatedly throughout the history of liberty
jurisprudence. These elements are identified in this Section.
A. HISTORY AND TRADITION
Due process•., has represented the balance.., struck between [indi-
vidual] liberty and the demands of organized society. . .. [H]aving
regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which it devel-
oped as well as the traditions from which it broke. 161
The Court has traditionally relied upon history, legal traditions, and
precedent to determine proper constitutional limits to state action in-
fringing on liberty. "History and tradition" analysis has often involved
tracing current law to its origins to determine whether the claimed liberty
interest is "deeply rooted in this Nation's History and tradition,' 162 and
157. Id. at 576. This included an opinion by the European Court of Human Rights,
authoritative in forty-five nations and state constitutional protection of homosexual activ-
ity. The Court criticized Chief Justice Burger's rendition of legal history in Bowers as im-
balanced and inaccurate, because it ignored many international authorities contradicting
his rendition. Id. at 572-73. The Court referenced a Model Penal Code provision promul-
gated in 1955 advising against criminal penalties for private consensual sex, a 1957 British
Parliament committee report recommending repeal of laws punishing homosexual conduct,
the Wolfenden Report: Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitu-
tion (1963), and the fact that Parliament enacted the report's recommendations 10 years
later, as well as decisions by the European Court of Human Rights. Id.
158. Id. at 577. Indeed, the Court stated that Bowers itself created uncertainty. Id.
159. Id. at 575. Although a misdemeanor, convictions result in notations on defendants'
records and registration as a "sex offender" in some states. Id. at 575-76.
160. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992) (emphasis
added.)
161. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
162. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). See also Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 506 (1965).
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"so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." 163 "History and tradition" has been defined to include
"objective" criteria such as legal precedent and recorded history, 164 as
well as the maxims and rules of traditional decisions.165 To this end, "his-
tory and tradition" has included the Court's own precedent, 166 English
common law,167 the Framers' intent, 168 political philosophy, 169 the laws of
the United States, 170 and foreign law.171
But history and tradition may not comport with contemporary notions
of justice, medical or social facts, or even basic equality among Ameri-
cans. American history includes slavery and other forms of gross ra-
cism, 172 treating women and children as property of men, 173 and
discrimination based on sexual orientation 174 and national origin.1 75
There are therefore important limitations to relying on history and tradi-
tion in defining liberty in contemporary society. The Court's obligation to
follow precedent as a stabilizing force in jurisprudence must be tempered
by its concomitant obligation to reverse precedent where "a prior judicial
ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was
for that very reason doomed. ' 176 History itself proves that what once was
a "natural" and "self-evident" ordering may later come to be seen as an
"artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and freedom. ' 177
Without an eye to cultural and human progression, putting stock in "tra-
163. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Snyder v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
164. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (referring to precedent as "ob-
jective criteria" when it consists of "the existing laws and practices of the Nation" and to
the fact that 49 of 50 states subject suspects to criminal trials without a jury in some
instances).
165. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 171 (1952).
166. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-68 (2003).
167. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969).
168. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 5 (1964).
169. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
170. See infra Section III.D.
171. See infra Section III.F.
172. Compare Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), with Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954).
173. For example, the Casey Court rejected the common law concept of women having
no legal status separate from her husband's, noting that as recently as 1961, women's pre-
sumed role in the family precluded her from having "full and independent legal status
under the Constitution." Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 897 (1992)
(quoting Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961)). The Court stated: "These views, of
course, are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family, the individual, or the
Constitution." Id. The Court went on to say that Pennsylvania's spousal notification provi-
sion "embodies a view of marriage consonant with the common-law status of married wo-
men but repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the
rights secured by the Constitution." Id. at 898.
174. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
175. See, e.g., Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
177. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
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dition" and precedent could entrench tyranny and perpetuate human in-
justices.1 78 To this end, the Court has recognized that history and
tradition may be a "starting point" in liberty analysis, but cannot be the
"ending point" of the due process inquiry.1 79
Analyzing American history and tradition therefore involves determin-
ing historical legal precedent and then examining it against the backdrop
of current societal norms and expectations to decide whether reasons ex-
ist to depart from precedent. In practice, this has meant reviewing pro-
gressive views of the nature of the liberty interest claimed; in-depth
analysis of bodily integrity and all of its ramifications in contemporary
society; medical, psychological, and social facts; and progressive cultural
values, often manifested by state and foreign law trends, particularly if
the trends demonstrate a rejection of precedent, and reversal would not
undermine individual or societal reliance on previously-established lib-
erty rights.180 In addition, the laws and traditions of recent history - the
past half century - are the most relevant to liberty analysis.'8 1 History
and tradition should be considered a factor in liberty analysis, but not the
sole criterion for defining liberty.
B. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT: PERSONAL AUTONOMY,
INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, AND INTIMACY
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of per-
sonhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.182
The Court has consistently emphasized that the core of liberty is the
individual's right to freedom from government interference with personal
autonomy,1 83 including intellectual development' 84 and intimate relation-
ships,1 85 as means of self-determination and discovering for oneself the
meaning of life. 186 Rights deemed "fundamental" under the Liberty
Clause have therefore revolved around private, personal decisions relat-
178. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 263 (1829) (indictment for shooting slave reversed
based on precedent), superseded by U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, recognized in
Rembert v. Monroe Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 95-4818 (JEI), 1997 WL 189318 (D.N.J. Apr.
14, 1997). See also Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (also superseded by the
Reconstruction Amendments).
179. "[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point
of the substantive due process inquiry." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
180. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575-77 (2003).
181. Id. at 571-72.
182. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
183. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
184. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
185. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479.




ing to marriage; procreation; contraception; family relationships; child
rearing, including educational decisions impacting intellectual develop-
ment; bodily autonomy; abortion; sexual privacy; private spaces; and rep-
utation or "stigma."1 87
State laws interfering with personal and intimate relationships have
often been viewed as ultra vires, because they interfere with self-determi-
nation and human bonding, which in turn impacts emotional and spiritual
growth, intellectual development, and often economic security. For exam-
ple, the Court has explained that family relationships are particularly
worthy of protection from state interference, because they "contribute so
powerfully to the happiness of individuals,"' 88 and because it is through
the family that we "inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural."1 89 Respect for the bonds between extended
family members, such as cousins, aunts, and uncles, are recognized as crit-
ical relationships in terms of economic security and emotional support,
and are therefore largely beyond the reach of state interference absent
compelling justification.' 90 Preserving the parent-child relationship is an
important government concern, in recognition of the value inherent in
close family ties and family harmony. 191 Sexual relationships and the per-
sonal bonds and emotional support they create are protected largely for
the same reasons. 192
State interference with intellectual freedom has similarly been declared
repugnant to the Constitution since the origins of substantive due pro-
cess. As early as 1897, the Court stated that liberty includes the "right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of his faculties; to be free to use
them in all lawful ways .... "193 As explained by the Court in the seminal
case of Meyer v. Nebraska, liberty includes the right to acquire useful
knowledge, which is "of supreme importance" to the American people. 194
Even more broadly, the Court has stated: "Our whole constitutional heri-
tage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control
men's minds."'195
Protecting private spheres such as individuals' psyches, bodies, 196 and
187. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-153.
188. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. See, e.g., Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-504. See also, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 482 (1972) (protection of association with friends and family).
190. Moore, 431 U.S. at 499 (When a city undertakes "intrusive regulation of the family
... judicial deference ... is inappropriate.").
191. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
192. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558; Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
193. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
194. 262 U.S. at 399-400. Note that the right was expressed as the teacher's right to
teach and the parents' right to control the child's intellectual development. Id. at 400.
195. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) (holding that a state has interest in protecting children from ignorance by enact-
ing compulsory education laws, but state's interest can be overcome by parent's choice of
educational limitations to protect their religious (Amish) values).
196. See infra Sec. III.C.
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residences has always been a primary liberty concern.1 97 The Court has
relied on the potential damage to a woman's psyche if she could be forced
to carry and bear an unwanted child to find that individual liberty is
broad enough to encompass a woman's abortion decision. 198 The Court
has sought to protect individuals from the psychological and social dam-
age that can result from "stigma," such as protecting women from the
stigma that can result from unwed motherhood,199 protecting minors
from stigma that can result from school suspension and expulsion, 2°° pro-
tecting homosexuals from sigma and discrimination,20 1 and protecting
prisoners from stigma resulting from mandatory drug treatment. 20 2
Spousal and sexual choices are largely beyond the government's reach in
recognition that these choices are directly related to developing a healthy
psyche and self-identity, and obtaining emotional and spiritual support
necessary for self-actualization. 20 3 The Court recently broadened this
protection consistent with "an emerging awareness that liberty gives sub-
stantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their pri-
vate lives."'20 4
The expectation of privacy in one's home is central to the American
concept of liberty. The Constitution protects citizens from governmental
intrusion into private space, such as the Fourth Amendment's protection
of "people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, '20 5 and the Due Process
Clause's protection of "the most private conduct" in the "most private of
places, the home. '20 6 In determining whether a right is fundamental and
worthy of heightened protection, the Court should analyze the nature of
the claimed interest by considering the various aspects of liberty identi-
fied in this Section.
C. BODILY INTEGRITY: PHYSICAL RESTRAINT, PAIN, AND INVASION
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the com-
mon law, than the right of every individual to the possession and con-
trol of his own person, free from all restraint and interference of
others.... Personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity,
197. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
198. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
199. Id.
200. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
201. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575-76.
202. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
203. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
204. Id. at 572.
205. Schmerber v. California, 757 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203-04
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (The right to privacy "has recognized a privacy interest
with reference to certain places without regard for the particular activities in which the
individuals who occupy them are engaged.").
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identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of
government.2
07
Physical autonomy, referred to as "bodily integrity," has consistently
been protected as a liberty right integral to self-determination. 20 8 The
Court has repeatedly prohibited the government from physical invasion
of an individual's body,20 9 including invasion with drugs.210 In defining
liberty, the Court has discussed control and autonomy over one's physical
body in numerous cases, and has specifically analyzed health risks im-
posed by state action, such as the level of risk involved in forced immuni-
zation,21 1 extracting a bullet from muscle tissue,21 2 and forcing a woman
to bear a child.21 3 Physical pain and restraint have also been elements of
liberty analysis, such as in relation to corporal punishment of children
and forced medical procedures.2 14 A constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in refusing unwanted medical treatment has been recognized for
over a century,21 5 grounded in the concept that individuals have the right
to make decisions about their physical bodies.2 16 In 1990, the Court rec-
ognized that this right extends to and individual's right to refuse medical
treatment that will save or prolong his or her life.2 17 The Court's liberty
concern relating to bodily integrity also includes a liberty right to avoid
antipsychotic medication2 18 and a right to avoid physical restraint. 219 Al-
though personal prerogatives regarding one's body do not always trump a
207. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-27 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S.
250, 251 (1891)).
208. As stated by Justice O'Connor: "Because our notions of liberty are inextricably
entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the Court has often
deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due
Process Clause." Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
209. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
210. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1982);
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).
211. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 1905).
212. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
213. In Casey, the Court expressed concern about how pervasively state interference
with a woman's right to choose invades the "private sphere of the family [and] ... bodily
integrity of the pregnant woman." Casey, 505 U.S. at 896.
214. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 761, 765; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-75 (1977);
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966).
215. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (referring to Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 25-27). See also
Winston, 470 U.S. at 758-59 ("[Bodily] intrusion may be 'unreasonable' even if likely to
produce evidence of a crime.").
216. See Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 27-28. Note, however, that the medical risks of
mandatory vaccination were subverted to the state's public health concern. Id.
217. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
218. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (holding that prisoners
possess a significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication).
219. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romero, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (holding that a retarded
adult has a right to freedom from bodily restraint); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (hold-




state's police power,220 protection of bodily integrity has been a historic
and important consideration in liberty analysis. Whether state action in-
fringes on bodily integrity should be a necessary element of liberty
analysis.
D. STATE LAWS
The primary and most reliable indication of [a national] consensus
is ... the pattern of enacted [state] laws.22'
Traditionally, the Court has relied on laws, opinions, and experiences
of the various United States in determining the parameters of individual
liberty rights. State laws reflect social norms222 and create expectations of
governmental conduct.223 State laws often contain relevant legislative
findings, typically grounded in natural and social science, past experience,
public safety, contemporary public opinion, and the outcome of a risk-
utility analysis concerning the balance struck between the individual's lib-
erty interest and the state's interest.
If a majority of the states' laws contradict a claimant's asserted liberty
right, this may persuade the Court that the challenged law is constitu-
tional. For example, in the incorporation cases, state law majority rule
was engaged to deny application of certain aspects of the Bill of Rights to
the states.224 In Bowers v. Hardwick and Washington v. Glucksberg, the
Court reviewed the historical and current laws in the United States to
determine whether the claimed rights to sexual privacy and suicide were
of a nature deserving of exacting judicial scrutiny. 225 The Bowers Court
relied on the fact that twenty-five states criminalized sodomy at that time,
which undermined a historical and traditional "right" of sodomy.226 The
Glucksberg Court found that the "majority" of states criminalized as-
220. See, e.g., Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-55 (holding that the state's interest in
protecting life of viable fetus trumps woman's unfettered right to abortion); Jacobson, 197
U.S. at 37-38 (forced vaccine held constitutional).
221. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 (1997) (quoting Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989)).
222. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (discussing norms reflected
by state law trends).
223. See generally, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442
U.S. 1 (1979); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
224. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 n.33 (1968) (forty-nine of fifty
states allow criminal trials without juries, but Louisiana was one of only three states that
did not require trial by jury for crimes imposing sentences of more than six months).
225. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-11 n. 8, 711-19 (reviewing the history of the law of
assisted suicide); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 nn.5-7 (1986).
226. The Court stated: "[T]o claim that a right to engage in [sodomy] is 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at
best facetious. . .. [and] the sodomy laws of some 25 States should [not] be invalidated on
this basis." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194, 196. See also United States v. Carolene Products, 304
U.S. 144, 150 n.3 (1938) (relying in part on the fact that thirty-eight states had restricted the
sale of filled milk to support its decision that public health policy justified deprivation of




sisted suicide,227 and relied in part on this fact to conclude that there is no
fundamental right to assisted suicide. Similarly, the Ingraham Court re-
lied on the absence of a state law trend to abolish school corporal punish-
ment to support its decision that no process is due prior to paddling
public school students.228
On the other hand, if a majority of state laws support a claimed liberty
right, the state laws may reflect a contemporary consensus, or a progres-
sive understanding of liberty that should be scrutinized carefully, 22 9 par-
ticularly if there is a recent a trend in the law.230 The right against double
jeopardy was recognized as basic to ordered liberty in part because all
states had banned it.231 The right to abortion232 and the right to engage
in private consensual homosexual activity 233 were recognized despite
their criminalization in many states, in part because the state law trend
was to recognize these rights. 234 A growing state law trend that rejects the
challenged law as unconstitutional should be considered most compelling
where the legal trend results from strong social or scientific data, or re-
flects progressive concepts of privacy and self-actualization. State laws
should be considered a necessary element of liberty analysis, because
they reflect social norms as declared by representative bodies, and help to
balance judges' personal views with social realities.
E. LEGISLATIVE FACTS: SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL FACTS,
PROFESSIONAL OPINION, AND "REASONED JUDGMENT"
In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a
disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced
227. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711 (reviewing state law against suicide as a starting
point in deciding that there is no fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide. Forty-four
states and the District of Columbia, as well as two territories prohibit or condemn assisted
suicide, which is also the norm among western democracies, such as Austria, Spain, Italy,
the United Kingdom, inter alia.). Id. n.8.
228. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-63 (1977). Only two states had banned
school paddling in 1977, Massachusetts and New Jersey. By 2008, however, twenty-nine
states have banned school corporal punishment, as well as numerous foreign nations. See,
e.g., www.stophitting.com.
229. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (noting that all states require a twelve-mem-
ber jury to impose the death sentence); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (noting
that all states prohibited double jeopardy).
230. See e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
231. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794-95.
232. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court clarified that criminalization of
abortion, while in effect in many states for over a century at the time of the decision, had
been controversial since ancient times, and that ancient religion did not bar abortion. Id. at
116, 130-40.
233. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579.
234. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 118. The Roe Court found a right of abortion despite the fact
that similar statutes existed in a majority of the states, in part because most federal and
state courts that had recently heard challenges to state abortion laws had declared them
unconstitutional, indicating a legal trend to protect the right to an abortion. Id. at 154. See
also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 ("[W]e think that our laws and traditions of the past half
century are of the most relevance here. These references show an emerging awareness that
liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their pri-
vate lives in matters pertaining to sex.").
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order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration
of conflicting claims on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly
mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a
progressive society.
235
The Court has repeatedly expressed its commitment to "reasoned judg-
ment"236 and a "rational process"' 237 grounded in "pragmatism," 238 in de-
fining liberty. Reviewing scientific23 9 or other relevant facts as part of the
liberty analysis furthers the Court's goal of producing neutral and well-
reasoned constitutional decisions. In this regard, the Court has repeatedly
relied upon medical facts, social facts, and professional opinion in defin-
ing liberty throughout the history of liberty jurisprudence.
As early as 1905, the Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts upheld
mandatory smallpox vaccine against a due process challenge 240 because,
although the challenger offered proof of possible injurious effects of the
vaccine, including possible death,241 the Court found that the majority of
medical professionals believed in the efficacy of the vaccine, which sup-
ported the state's decision to protect the public health with mandatory
vaccination.242 Similarly, in United States v. Carolene Products,243 the
Court upheld the Filled Milk Act based on an "extensive investigation,"
including congressional hearings in which "eminent scientists and health
experts testified" regarding the injurious effects of filled milk on public
health.244 The Court in Schmerber v. California and Winston v. Lee relied
235. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (emphasis added and citations
omitted).
236. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992).
237. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
"[D]ue process follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what is deemed
reasonable and right. It is to be applied.., to facts and circumstances as they arise .... " Id.
238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854. See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-63 (1995) (giv-
ing objective factors to consider in characterizing the liberty infringement and deciding
whether due process was violated, including health risks and other medical evidence).
239. Science denotes objective, systematically organized data that logically and reason-
ably leads to conclusions. MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/science. To the extent that scientific facts are contrary to a court's factual
conclusions regarding a topic under review, the court should be bound to explain the dis-
crepancy. To the extent that no clear scientific data exists, the court should defer to the
legislatures with their "superior opportunity" to obtain scientific data concerning the issue
being reviewed. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 787-88 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
240. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). The plaintiff challenged the state
law on privilege and immunities grounds as well as equal protection and due process.
241. Id. at 36.
242. Id. at 34. The Court also stated that it would be an improper invasion of the indi-
vidual's rights if the vaccine had "no real or substantial relation to [the state's objectives of
health, safety, or morals]." Id. at 31. See also, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
226-27 (1990) (relying on psychiatric experts' findings in substantive due process analysis).
243. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
244. Id. at 148-49. The Court summarized the congressional reports, finding that filled
milk lacks important vitamins that whole milk contains. Id. at 149 n.2. The Court found:
"There is now extensive literature indicating wide recognition by scientists and dieticians of
the great importance to the public health of butter fat and whole milk as the prime source
of vitamins, which are essential growth producing and disease preventing elements in the
diet." Id. at 150 n.3 (relying on various academic articles and books). Note that the Fifth
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on medical evidence to determine the degree of liberty infringement
based on the level of health risk and pain to decide whether the state's
interest in procuring criminal evidence justified invasion of a suspect's
body.245
In Roe v. Wade, the Court relied extensively on the medical facts avail-
able at that time relating to fetal development and viability in creating
constitutional doctrine convergent with the trimesters of pregnancy. 24 6
The Roe v. Wade Court also relied on professional opinion and resolu-
tions of professional organizations knowledgeable about the subject mat-
ter, such as the American Medical Association ("AMA"), the American
Public Health Association ("APHA"), and the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA"). 247 The Casey Court similarly relied on medical evidence,
such as advances in neonatal care, in reaching its decision.248 The Casey
Court heard the testimony of numerous experts regarding the emotional
and social impact on women if the state could require them to give their
spouses notice prior to an abortion, including findings of the AMA and
many other experts. 249 More recently, the Stenberg v. Carhart Court de-
ferred to medical experts' testimony regarding increased medical risks to
women resulting from Nebraska's partial birth abortion law to declare it
unconstitutional.250
Similarly, the Court relied on social science experiments to uphold
state laws requiring less than twelve jury members. 251 Justices Brennan
and Marshall concurred in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,252 to clarify
that the challenged zoning ordinance rested on Caucasian concepts of a
"nuclear family," a social construct and pattern in white suburbia that
disproportionately harmed black families when used to define "fam-
Amendment due process challenge in Carolene Products was brought as a property depri-
vation claim.
245. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763-65 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 769-72 (1966).
246. The Court held that the state's interest in the health of the mother becomes com-
pelling at the end of the first trimester, and the state's interest in the life of the fetus
becomes compelling at viability, which at that time was approximately the beginning of the
third trimester (24-28 weeks into gestation). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160, 163-65 (1973).
247. Id. at 141-47. The Court specifically noted that the AMA supported abortion
under proper circumstances, based on medical safety, and that the principles of medical
ethics do not prohibit the practice. Id. at 144 n.39. The APHA took the position in 1970
that abortion "must be readily available." Id. at 144. And, the ABA had approved a Uni-
form Abortion Act, indicating a legal trend to legalize abortion. Id. at 146-47. The Court
considered the imminent psychological harm and emotional distress that may result from
an inability to obtain an abortion, although it did not cite social science data in making this
finding. Id. at 153.
248. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
249. Id. at 887-95. Ultimately, the Court found that the spousal notification require-
ment was too great a burden, because social research proved that it could lead to some
women foregoing an abortion to avoid a violent reaction from their spouses. Id. The Court
specifically clarified that, even if only "one percent" are restricted from obtaining an abor-
tion, the proper focus is on "the group for whom the law is a restriction .. " Id. at 895.
250. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 924-29 (2000).
251. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
252. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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ily. ''2 53 The justices relied on a number of social science books and data to
find that the government's failure to support the establishment of ex-
tended families may lead to increases in delinquency, crime, mental ill-
ness, and drug abuse - social realities that the Court must consider in
order to make a well-reasoned constitutional decision.254 The Lawrence
Court found as a matter of historical fact that there was no longstanding
precedent criminalizing sodomy, and to the extent sodomy prohibitions
existed, they were aimed at non-procreative sex, not homosexuality, con-
trary to Justice Burger's rendition of history in Bowers v. Hardwick.
2 55
These so-called "legislative facts,' 256 while not without controversy,
257
have been called necessary to "the continued success of the judiciary"
because courts sometimes have access to facts that were not available to
the legislature at the time the challenged law was enacted.2 58 In addition,
judicial review of legislative facts constrains judicial discretion by forcing
judges to justify their decisions in light of available objective evidence:
"[N]o rule of law should outlive its basis in legislative fact."25 9
Normatively, the Court should consider scientific or other facts rele-
vant to liberty issues, to enhance objective and reasonable constitutional
interpretation. At times, scientific or social facts have imposed an "obli-
gation" 260 on the Court to reform legal doctrine and to overrule prece-
dent because the "facts have so changed, or come to be seen so
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification."' 261 In this vein, the Court overruled Lochner v. New York
upon finding that the philosophical underpinnings and social facts upon
which Lochner rested had been proven false, resulting in great social
harm and a need for legal reform consistent with the true social facts.
262
253. The zoning ordinance defining families to exclude "extended" families displayed a
"depressing insensitivity toward the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of
our society," i.e., black families. Id. at 508-10 nn.4-10.
254. Id. at 510 n.7.
255. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-73 (2003).
256. See Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. Cr.
REV. 75, 77 (1960).
257. See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldbar, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1957-64 (2006); Rachael
N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental
Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 657 (1987); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Re-
ception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111, 126 (1988). See also Allison Morse,
Good Science, Bad Law: A "Multiple Balancing" Approach to Adjudication, 46 S.D. L.
REV. 410, 410 (2000-2001) (arguing that the Court should consider natural and social sci-
ence, to fulfill its mission to protect fundamental rights).
258. Karst, supra note 256, at 76-77.
259. Id. at 108.
260. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992).
261. Id. at 854-55. See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) ("[T]hose
who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses ... knew times can blind us to certain
truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke
its principles in their own search for greater freedom.").
262. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). As stated by the Casey
Court in 1992, "the interpretation of contractual freedom protected in Adkins rested on
fundamentally false factual assumptions about the capacity of a relatively unregulated mar-
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Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education,263 the Court relied on "mod-
ern authority" consisting of publications produced by psychologists, such
as the Journal of Psychology, to reach its conclusion that segregation po-
tentially damages African American children cognitively and motivation-
ally.2 64 The Court found that the social facts upon which Plessy was
decided were "so clearly at odds with the facts apparent to the Court in
1954 that the decision to reexamine Plessy was on this ground alone not
only justified but required.''265
The Court's historical commitment to social and scientific fact explains
why, in the Court's own words, Meyer and Pierce survived while Lochner
and Plessy suffered demise. 266 The judiciary has a duty to protect individ-
ual liberty from state infringement by educating itself about all available
scientific or social facts relevant to the claimed liberty right before ren-
dering its opinion. Advances in natural and social science compel the
Court to reevaluate constitutional jurisprudence regularly to avoid "doc-
trinal anachronism discounted by [contemporary] society. '267
F. FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
The right petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no
showing that in this country the governmental interest in circumscrib-
ing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or urgent.268
The Court has traditionally considered foreign law and international
policy to interpret liberty. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Court relied
ket to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare.... The facts upon which the earlier casehad premised a constitutional resolution of social controversy had proven to be untrue, and
history's demonstration of their untruth not only justified but required the new choice of
constitutional principle that West Coast Hotel announced .... [T]he clear demonstration
that the facts.., were different from those previously assumed warranted the repudiation
of old law." Casey, 505 U.S. at 861-62 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court found that
Brown v. Board of Education addressed "facts of life" that were not understood at the time
Plessy v. Ferguson was decided, which required a change in constitutional jurisprudence.
id. at 863.
263. 347 U.S. 483 (1952). Brown was an equal protection case, but the Court's analysis
revolved around concepts of liberty created by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's
focus was on the "right" of education and the effect of segregation on an African Ameri-
can child's psyche.
264. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. at 494 n.11. The Brown Court repudiated the
social facts upon which Plessy was based (the separate-but-equal doctrine) recognizing thatlegally-sanctioned segregation indeed places a "badge of inferiority" on African American
children. The Court stressed that segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority ... that
may affect [Negro children's] hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone ...[and creates a] sense of inferiority [that] affects the motivation of a child to learn ... [and]
has a tendency to (retard) the educational and mental development of Negro children." Id.
at 494. See also Casey, 505 U .S. at 862-63.
265. Id. at 863 (emphasis added). "In constitutional adjudication as elsewhere in life,
changed circumstances may impose new obligations, and the thoughtful part of the Nation
could accept each decision to overrule a prior case as a response to the Court's constitu-
tional duty." Id. at 864.
266. Id. at 861-64.
267. Id. at 855.
268. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
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on numerous European countries' compulsory vaccination laws to uphold
an early Massachusetts law requiring smallpox vaccinations. 269 In the in-
corporation cases, the Court often looked to European law, including En-
glish, Greek, and Roman law, to determine the origins of the claimed
rights.270 Similarly, in Bowers v. Hardwick,271 the Court relied in part on
English common law to determine that engaging in homosexual sodomy
does not deserve fundamental rights status. 2 72 Later, the Lawrence Court
clarified that the European Convention on Human Rights decided in
1981 that homosexual activity was a protected human right, undermining
the Bowers Court's "sweeping references" to a longstanding history and
tradition of Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards criminalizing
sodomy.2 73 The Glucksberg Court upheld Washington's law against as-
sisted suicide, noting that a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide is the
norm in western democracies, 27 4 and that data from the Netherlands
demonstrates frightening misuse of euthanasia.
275
The Court has recently defined constitutional rights in reliance on for-
eign law showing a "consensus" in relation to other vague constitutional
clauses as well. For example, the Court has relied on foreign policy in
Eighth Amendment cases to determine whether capital punishment of
juveniles and retarded persons constitutes "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment in step with "evolving standards of decency. '276 In Roper v. Sim-
mons, the Court found that imposing the death penalty on juveniles
violated the Eighth Amendment in part based on the "stark reality that
the United States is the only country in the world" that sanctions the
juvenile death penalty. 277 The overwhelming weight of international
opinion disfavoring the juvenile death penalty did not control the consti-
tutional decision, but provided "respected and significant" support for
269. 197 U.S. 11, 31-33 (1905). The Court cited statistics and laws from Denmark, Swe-
den, German states, Prussia, Romania, Hungary, Serbia, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal,
Belgium, Norway, Austria, and Turkey to support its determination that the state law was
valid under the police power despite its infringement on liberty. Id. at 32 n.1.
270. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794-95 (1969).
271. 478 U.S. 186 (1969).
272. Id. at 903-04 nn.5-6 (listing state laws making sodomy illegal).
273. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572-73. The Court went on to note that the reasoning of
Bowers has been consistently rejected in the European Court of Human Rights, and that
"other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right
of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct." Id. at 576-77.
274. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711 n.8 (1997) (citing a Canadian case
discussing laws in Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Switzerland, and France).
275. Id. at 734 (noting that one study found nearly 6,000 cases of "assisted suicide"
where there was no explicit patient request or consent, leading one researcher to conclude
that the "risk of [assisted suicide] ... abuse is neither speculative nor distant").
276. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 312, 316 n.21 (2002) (noting that within the "world community," imposing the death
penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded persons is overwhelmingly disap-
proved, which supported the Court's finding of a "national consensus").
277. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (noting that the United States is one of only two countries
that has failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child-the
other country being Somalia).
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the Court's own conclusion.278
The Court's use of foreign law and international policy to shape Ameri-
can constitutional law has drawn sharp criticism reminiscent of the judi-
cial conflict in the incorporation cases, grounded in concerns about
judicial bias and federalism. 279 Justice Scalia has referred to the Court's
use of foreign law, inter alia,2 80 to support a "national consensus" against
the use of capital punishment for retarded persons as "the Prize for the
Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate 'national consensus,'-"281 and crit-
icized the Court for resting its opinion "obviously upon nothing but the
personal views of its Members. '282 Justice Scalia similarly criticized the
Lawrence Court for relying on foreign law, stating that the Court "should
not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans. '283 Justice
Rehnquist has referred to the Court's reliance on foreign law, inter alia,
as "antithetical to considerations of federalism .... "284
Despite the criticism about engaging foreign law to help interpret lib-
erty and other human rights provisions of the Constitution, 285 recent Su-
preme Court opinions accurately depict the established tradition of
reviewing foreign law and international policy to help interpret the
American Constitution.286 Foreign law and international human rights
declarations may reveal Americans' expectations of liberty, such as in
Lawrence v. Texas. Particularly where existing constitutional interpreta-
tion diverges from the world consensus, foreign law and international pol-
icy should be considered in interpreting the American Constitution's
promise of liberty.
278. Id. at 578.
279. See supra notes 13-15, 17, & 72 and accompanying text.
280. The Court also relied on opinion polls, and the views of professional and religious
organizations. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia insinuated in
Lawrence, for example, that the AALS had "largely signed on to the so-called homosexual
agenda," indicating his concern that special interest groups' opinions and agendas have
been relied upon by the Court in making constitutional decisions. See Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
281. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
283. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
284. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 322-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that punishment is a
question of legislative policy, and that the reason state legislation is considered the clearest
and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is because of the constitu-
tional role legislatures play in expressing state policy).
285. See also, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119
HARV. L. REV. 148, 149 (2005). Professor Young argues that the Court factored foreign law
into the denominator of the capital punishment equation to decrease the percentage of
support for capital punishment in cases such as Roper, and that while considering foreign
policy as persuasive authority in making policy choices, "counting noses" of countries op-
posed to capital punishment of certain individuals unjustifiably accords authoritative
weight to worldwide numbers in interpreting the American Constitution. Id. at 149-53.
Professor Young, like Scalia, argued that the Court's own moral predilections are the driv-
ing force behind cases such as Roper. Id. at 156. Professor Young also shared Rehnquist's
and Scalia's concerns about separation of powers and federalism. Id. at 163-65.
286. "Over the course of nearly half a century, the Court has consistently referred to
foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards of de-




IV. THE DANGER OF INCONSISTENT LIBERTY ANALYSIS
The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the Judiciary
as fit to determine what the Nation's law means .... The legitimacy of
the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation.287
Inconsistent interpretive methods in liberty cases are not desirable.
When the Court chooses definitions of liberty on a case-by-case basis, the
risk is that similar liberty interests may be treated differently. The result
is incoherent and unpredictable liberty analysis, which fails to provide
Americans with a clear and stable understanding of their liberty rights
and fails to engender trust in the judiciary. This Section demonstrates in-
consistent liberty analyses in similar cases, resulting in unreliable liberty
precedent, and argues that adopting the six element test proposed herein
is a step toward more consistent liberty analysis and more reliable liberty
decisions.
A. STANLEY & MICHAEL H.
In both Stanley v. Illinois288 and Michael H. v. Gerald D.,289 unwed
fathers sought to have their relationships with their children declared
protected liberty rights after losing custody290 of their children through
application of state statutory presumptions. The Court reviewed the two
matters in 1972 and 1989, respectively.
Peter Stanley had lived with his children's mother intermittently for 18
years and had "sired and raised" three children with her.291 When the
mother died, state law presumed that Stanley was an unfit parent without
a hearing or proof of neglect, based on the fact that he was not married to
the children's mother. 292 The children were therefore declared wards of
the state.293 Stanley challenged the state law presumption as an unconsti-
tutional interference with his liberty right to maintain relationships with
his children. The state argued that its legal presumption that unmarried
fathers are "unfit" parents was valid, because most unwed fathers are
"unsuitable and neglectful" parents, 294 and that therefore, a blanket pre-
sumption was appropriate, rendering consideration of adjudicative facts
287. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865-66 (1992).
288. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
289. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
290. In Stanley, Mr. Stanley had been living with his children intermittently throughout
his 18 year relationship with their mom, and had control and custody of his children as a
practical reality. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646. In Michael H., Michael had visitation rights,
which are essentially partial custody and considered "joint custody" under some states'
laws. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116.
291. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650.
292. Id. at 646.
293. Id. at 650.




The Stanley Court focused on the nature of the interest at stake. Rely-
ing on the "importance of the family" and cases broadly construing family
autonomy, such as Meyer and Griswold, the Court found that Stanley's
interest in a relationship with his children was "cognizable and substan-
tial."'296 The Court found that family relationships "unlegitimized by a
marriage ceremony" were protected liberty interests because the bonds
between non-marital children and their parents are "often as warm, en-
during, and important as those arising within a more formally organized
family unit. '297  The presumption against Stanley was declared
unconstitutional:
Procedure and presumption is always cheaper and easier than indi-
vidualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure fore-
closes the determinative issues of competence and care, when it
explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it
needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of
both parent and child. 298
To the contrary, the Michael H. Court 299 upheld a California law that
created a presumption of paternity in favor of a mother's husband that
could never be challenged by the child's biological father.300 Michael and
Carole began an adulterous affair in Los Angeles when Carole's husband,
Gerald, was living in New York. Michael's daughter, Victoria, was con-
ceived. After Victoria was born, Carole and Victoria lived in a "variety of
quasi-family units," including a quasi-family unit with Michael intermit-
tently,30 1 during which time Michael supported Victoria and held her out
295. "[U]nwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children and ... it is unneces-
sary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether particular fathers are in fact
unfit parents before they are separated from their children." Id. at 647.
296. Id. at 652.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 656-57.
299. Michael H. was a 5-4 plurality decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ken-
nedy and O'Connor joined (in whole or part) Scalia's opinion. Stevens cast the fifth vote,
based on the erroneous understanding that Michael had standing to challenge paternity
under California law. See infra note 302. The remaining justices dissented, with Justice
Brennan writing a detailed dissent.
300. The statute allowed for a challenge to the "conclusive" presumption that the hus-
band is the father of a child born into a marriage only by the husband and wife. Michael H.,
491 U.S at 117-18. Blood tests showed a 98% probability that Michael was Victoria's natu-
ral father, and the child's mother, Carole, had signed a stipulation admitting that Michael
was Victoria's father, but later instructed her attorneys not to file it with the court. Id. at
114-15. Michael could not challenge the presumption under California law; Justice Stevens
was mistaken in his belief that Michael had standing to challenge paternity. See id. at 133
(Stevens, J., concurring); E-Mail from Leslie Ellen Shear, Counsel for Michael H., to De-
ana Pollard Sacks, Professor of Law, The Thurgood Marshall School of Law (Feb. 18, 2008,
11:40:19 A.M.) (on file with the author). Victoria's lack of standing to challenge paternity
gave rise to her equal protection claim. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130-31.
301. The family unit between Michael, Carole, and Victoria was less enduring than
Stanley's family unit. Id. at 113-14. Michael lived with Victoria and her mother between
January and March, 1982 in St. Thomas where Michael "held Victoria out as his child," and
again in Los Angeles from August, 1983 until May, 1984. Id. at 114-15. Carole and Victo-
ria lived with Gerald for a total of seven months between 1981 and 1984, and never for
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as his daughter, and Victoria called Michael "Daddy. '30 2 After Carole
and Michael had a falling-out and Carole denied Michael access to Victo-
ria,303 Michael and Victoria both challenged the law on asserted rights to
a parent-child relationship with one another.
The Court framed Michael's claim to know his daughter as "whether
the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria
has been treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of
our society."' 3°4 Victoria's asserted right was framed as "a due proc-
ess right to maintain filial relationships with both Michael and Gerald
... that a state must recognize multiple fatherhood .... -305 The Court
looked to the "history and tradition" of presumptions against declaring
children illegitimate to determine whether the claimed liberty interests
were "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental. '30 6 The Court relied on two policies derived from
sources as old as 1836:307 the "primary policy" of avoiding declaring a
child illegitimate, which could deprive children of financial rights and
render them "wards of the state; '' 3°8 and the "secondary policy" of "pro-
moting peace and tranquility of States and families. ' 30 9 The Court found
that the "marital family" 310 has been protected historically in our society,
not a "relationship established by a married woman, her lover, and their
child,"311 concluding that Michael's and Victoria's claims were "not the
stuff of which fundamental rights qualifying as liberty interests are
made." 312
The difference in liberty analysis between Stanley and Michael H. is
striking. In Stanley, the adjudicative facts concerning the bonds that had
been formed through Stanley's involvement with his children were criti-
cal, and the Court's focus was on the nature of the parent-child relation-
longer than three months at a time. Brief for Appellant Victoria D. at 9-10, Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (No. 87-746) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant Victoria D]. Carole
and Victoria lived with another man, Scott K., from May, 1982 until March, 1983. Id. at 10.
302. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
303. See infra note 319.
304. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124.
305. Id. at 130-31. "When identifying and assessing the competing interests of liberty
and authority, for example, the breadth of expression that a litigant or a judge selects in
stating the competing principles will have much to do with the outcome and may be dispos-
itive.... Just as results in substantive due process cases are tied to the selections of state-
ments of the competing interests, the acceptability of the results is a function of the good
reasons for the selections made." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 769-70 (1997).
306. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
307. Id. at 124-25 (citing, inter alia, H. NICHOLAS, ADULTINE BASTARDY 1 (1836), and
J. SCHOULER, LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS, Sec. 225 (1882)). Justice Brennan
openly criticized Justice Scalia's opinion for relying on "exclusively historical analysis"
grounded in "old" law such as Bracton, Blackstone, and Kent because it provided the "his-
tory" Scalia was looking for to support his morality-based decision. Id. at 137-138 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
308. Id. at 125.
309. Id. (citing SCHOULER, supra note 309, at 304).
310. Id. at 125.
311. Id. at 124 n.3.
312. Id. at 127.
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ship as part of the privacy aspect of the Liberty Clause. In Michael H.,
the Court engaged an "exclusively historical analysis" 313 grounded in ob-
solete assumptions about non-marital children. The precedent relied
upon in Stanley was broad and basic,3 14 whereas the precedent relied
upon in Michael H. was narrow, at least somewhat obsolete, and entirely
undermined by the adjudicative facts; Victoria was not subject to the fi-
nancial risks of being declared "illegitimate" in prior eras,31 5 and the mar-
riage between Carole and Gerald had not been "peaceful and tranquil"
during the relevant periods. 31 6 The Michael H. Court dismissed the pro-
tected liberty rights precedent contained in the "unwed father" cases,
which had produced a unifying theme: where a biological father has
demonstrated a commitment to his child by helping to rear the child, he
acquires protection for his relationship with his child under the Due Pro-
cess Clause.317 The Michael H. Court distinguished Stanley as protecting
the "unitary family," not relationships between children and their fa-
thers.3 18 But this distinction is superficial considering that in neither case
was a traditional "unitary family" established; Stanley's and Michael's re-
lationships with their offspring's mothers were both "intermittent" and
not particularly stable.31 9
313. Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
314. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
315. Both Michael and Gerald had supported Victoria financially and wanted to be
declared her legal father. There was no risk that Victoria could be rendered destitute or a
ward of the state. Michael H., 419 U.S. at 114-15. In addition, the "primary policy" had
been rendered moot since children have been declared constitutionally entitled to parental
support since the 1970s. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (intestate inheri-
tance); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (child support).
316. See infra note 319. Carole's marriage with Gerald had not stabilized between Sep-
tember, 1980, when Carole began her relationship with Michael, until June, 1984, when she
reconciled with Gerald. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113-15.
317. Id. at 142-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White criticized Justice Scalia's ap-
proach as failing to consider the Court's own precedent: "The basic principle enunciated in
the Court's unwed father cases is that an unwed father who has demonstrated a sufficient
commitment to his paternity ... has a protected liberty interest in a relationship with his
child." Id. at 157-58 (White, J., dissenting). See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261
(1983) ("When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by 'com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' his interest in
personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process
clause. At that point it may be said that 'he acts as a father toward his children' .... [T]he
emotional attachments ... derive from the intimacy of daily association.") (internal quota-
tions and citations omitted).
318. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
319. The Stanley Court found on the basis of uncontradicted testimony of Peter Stanley
that he had lived with the mother of his children for 18 years "intermittently." Stanley, 405
U.S. at 646. In Michael H., during the time that Michael H. and Carole D. were fighting
over visitation, Carole and Gerald were living in Los Angeles and New York, respectively,
and the trial court ordered visitation for Michael pursuant to a court-appointed psycholo-
gist's recommendation based on Victoria's best interests. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115. Soon
thereafter, Carole D. fled the jurisdiction with Victoria, taking her to New York to be with
her husband. Id. While contempt proceedings were pending based on Carole's unautho-
rized move to New York with Victoria, Gerald D. intervened in the action, and the trial
court decided to wait to determine whether Michael could get visitation under California
Civil Code Section 4601 until after the appeal pending on the constitutionality of Califor-
nia Evidence Code Section 621 was resolved. By the time that the Supreme Court finally
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The Michael H. Court's exclusive focus on precedent of questionable
relevance appears to be an excuse for the Court to impose its own moral
code: the Court sounded disgusted by Michael's "unfamiliar or repel-
lant"320 practice of conceiving a child in the context of an adulterous af-
fair, and repeatedly referred to Michael as the "adulterous" natural
father.321 Indeed, the Court's analysis reveals a presumption about
Michael's moral character similar to the presumption that the Court con-
demned the State of Illinois for making about Stanley's moral charac-
ter.322 The Michael H. Court denied Michael the same liberty right to
know his offspring that it granted Stanley, despite the fact that the cases
were factually similar, based apparently on one repeatedly-noted distinc-
tion: Michael was an adulterer, not just an unmarried father.
The Court's one-dimensional analysis323 in Michael H. illustrates the
danger of defining liberty by the moral viewpoints of nine elite justices.
Although adultery may be relevant, the Court should have considered a
number of critical factors that it disregarded. For example, the Court did
not even address Victoria's psychological best interests, the usual stan-
dard for determining custody between parents324 and a "compelling"
state interest. 325 The court-appointed psychologist 32 6 determined that
visitation with Michael was in Victoria's best interests, because Victoria
was "equally attached" to her biological mother and father.327 Indeed,
the psychologist concluded that it was important for Victoria to maintain
contact with Michael because Michael was "the single adult in Victoria's
life most committed to caring for her needs on a long term basis." 328
resolved the constitutional issue, Michael had been deprived of visitation with Victoria for
about five years, and the Court relied upon the fact that Gerald and Carole had established
a stable marital environment during those years to deny Michael's rights to visitation. Tele-
phone interview with Robert Boraks, Counsel for Michael H. (Feb. 12, 2008); Telephone
interview with Joel Aaronson, Counsel for Michael H. (Feb. 12, 2008). See also Michael H.,
491 U.S. at 117-19.
320. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
321. See id. at 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[N]o fewer than six times, the plurality
refers to Michael as the 'adulterous natural father' or the like.").
322. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57 (noting that "present realities" trump marital
"formalities").
323. Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the plurality opinion engaged "exclusively his-
torical analysis" that was an "unfortunate departure from our prior cases and from sound
constitutional decisionmaking."). See also id. at 145-47 (discussing precedent regarding
family integrity).
324. See id. at 118 (citing CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. § 4601 (West 1983).
325. States have a compelling interest in safeguarding children's psychological well-be-
ing. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
326. See Brief for Appellant Victoria D., supra note 301, at 12-13.
327. See id. at 12 (Victoria was found to be attached "principally and equally" to
Michael and Carole.). Michael originally was awarded visitation based upon the psycholo-
gist's evaluation finding that Victoria had "equal attachments to Carole and Michael." E-
Mail from Leslie Ellen Shear, Counsel for Michael H., to Deana Pollard Sacks, Professor
of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law (Feb. 18, 2008, 11:40:19 A.M.) (on file with
author). See also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 115. However, a trial judge later denied visita-
tion, apparently concluding on his own that having two father figures could confuse Victo-
ria. Id. at 135.
328. Brief for Appellant Victoria D., supra note 301, at 12-13 (emphasis added).
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Based on the psychologist's report, the court-appointed guardian ad litem
sought to secure Victoria's right to maintain a relationship with Michael.
Yet, the Court summarily dismissed the experts' opinions: "[W]hatever
the merits of the guardian ad litem's belief that [visitation with Michael
and Gerald] can be of great psychological benefit to a child, the claim
that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in the
history or traditions of this country. ' 329 No legislative facts bearing on the
psychological risks to Victoria were presented or analyzed.330 In addi-
tion, state laws were brought to the Court's attention that undermined
the "history and tradition" of denying rights to biological fathers of chil-
dren born into extant marriages, but the fact that a number of states al-
lowed a natural father to rebut marital presumptions of paternity was
dismissed as "irrelevant. '331
Michael was shocked and "devastated" by the Court's decision, be-
cause he, like his lawyers, believed that he had a liberty interest in his
relationship with his daughter,332 an understandable expectation created
by Stanley and the Court's other unwed father cases, as well as the
Court's generally strong protection of even extended family relationships
against state infringement.333 The Court should be required to "dig" a
little deeper than it did in Michael H.,3 3 4 to analyze fully and reasonably
claims as important as the ones presented by Michael and Victoria. While
it may not be clear what the Court's ultimate decision would have been in
Michael H. had the Court fully analyzed the relevant precedent, expert
opinion, state law trends, and any legislative facts or foreign trends had
they been presented, what is clear is that he opinion smacks of disdain for
Michael and supplied "no objective means" for subsequent liberty inter-
329. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 130-31.
330. The only evidence presented regarding Victoria's best interests was the court-ap-
pointed psychologist's recommendation from 1984, which found that Victoria should have
visitation with both "fathers." E-Mail from Leslie Ellen Shear, Counsel for Michael H., to
Deana Pollard Sacks, Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law (Mar. 8 2008,
6:04:28 P.M.) (on file with author). In other liberty cases, the Court relies on social science
data to reach a fully-informed decision. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 508 (1976); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954). It would seem that, in
the absence of contradictory professional opinion, the court-appointed psychologist's opin-
ion should have been respected or investigated, but not summarily dismissed.
331. Justice Scalia stated that these state laws beg the issue of whether the states "in
fact award substantive parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within, and
born into, an extant martial union .... We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that
has done so." Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127. Indeed, the California legislature amended the
presumption of legitimacy statute relied upon in Michael H. in reaction to the Michael H.
decision to allow both putative fathers and children to rebut the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy in certain cases, instead of just the husband and wife, as in Michael H. See CAL.
EVID. CODE § 621 (West 1966) (repealed in 1994). See also Mindy S. Halpern, Father
Knows Best-But Which Father? California's Presumption of Legitimacy Loses its Conclu-
siveness: Michael H. v. Gerald D. and its Aftermath, 25 Loy. L. A. L. REv. 275, 305-11
(1991).
332. Telephone interview with Robert Boraks, counsel for Michael H. (Feb. 12, 2008).
333. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
334. See Tribe, supra note 23, at 496 (stating that the geological form of rights construc-
tion involves "digging beneath a recognized enumerated right ... to unearth the logical or
sociological presuppositions of those rights ... .
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pretation,335 causing Justice Brennan to suggest that moral judgment and
personal bias motivated the plurality.336
B. BOWERS & LAWRENCE
The Court addressed the issue of whether liberty precludes a state from
criminalizing sodomy twice in a seventeen-year period and reached oppo-
site conclusions. In Bowers v. Hardwick,337 the Court reversed the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision that the nature of liberty as defined by Griswold
and Roe, inter alia, protects private and intimate associations, including
homosexual activity. 338 The Bowers Court framed the issue in a way that
restricted the meaning of liberty,339 instead of construing liberty broadly
as it did in Meyer, Griswold, and Roe, inter alia.
The Bowers Court found that its prior privacy precedent did not bear
"any resemblance" to the asserted right of sodomy: "No connection be-
tween family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual
activity on the other has been demonstrated .... ",340 The Court looked to
its definitions of liberty in Palko v. Connecticut and Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, concluding that "to claim that a right to engage in such con-
duct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious. ' 341 Georgia's law was
upheld based on the notion that it reflected "majority sentiments about
the morality of homosexuality. '342
Justice Blackmun criticized the Bowers Court's issue-framing choice
because it "distorted" the issue presented and smacked of animosity to-
wards homosexuals. 343 According to Blackmun, Hardwick's claim was
about the "right to be let alone. ' 344 Blackmun criticized the Court for its
"refusal to consider the broad principles that have informed our treat-
335. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 138.
336. Justice Brennan referred to the fact that Justice Scalia based his decision on the
fact of the marriage between Carole and Gerald, and kept referring to Michael as an "adul-
terer." Id. at 144. Ironically, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. criticized Bren-
nan's dissent as providing such "imprecise guidance [that its analysis would] permit judges
to dictate rather than discern society's views ... leaving judges free to decide as they think
best." Id. at 127 n.6.
337. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
338. Id. at 189.
339. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
340. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
341. Id. at 193-94.
342. Id. at 196. As noted by Justice Blackmun, the Court presented no facts showing a
moral consensus by the majority of Georgians that homosexuality is immoral; indeed, the
electorate's representatives had enacted a law reflective of the belief that all sodomy is
immoral, not homosexual sodomy. Id. at 219 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
343. Id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id. at 212 ("Private biases may
be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.
No matter how uncomfortable a certain group may make the majority of this Court, we
have held that [m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person's physical liberty.") (Internal quotations and citations omitted).




ment of privacy, ' 345 and expressed concern about the lack of legislative
facts: the record was "barren of any evidence" that sodomy spreads com-
municable diseases or fosters criminal activity, as asserted by the state of
Georgia. 346 Blackman argued that "decency" and "morality" are subjec-
tive terms and not a proper basis for denying liberty rights, because the
Court is bound to protect citizens "whose choices upset the majority. 347
Six years later, the Court agreed with this latter conclusion, stating that
its obligation is to "define the liberty for all, not mandate our own moral
code." 348
In 2003, the Lawrence Court engaged a multi-dimensional analysis and
overruled Bowers.349 The Court carefully characterized the liberty at
stake by conducting a thorough analysis of the four relevant elements
proposed herein:350 history and precedent; the nature of the infringe-
ment, such as stigma resulting from the law and the law's impact on the
human psyche, the emotional need to bond and to form intimate relation-
ships, and self-actualization; the state law trend to de-criminalize sodomy
(from fifty states in 1961, to twenty-four in 1986, to thirteen in 2004);351
and the rejection of Bowers in the world community, such as the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, binding on twenty-one nations at the
time of Bowers and forty-five nations at the time of Lawrence.352
Engaging a full-bodied, multi-dimensional liberty analysis grounded
the Lawrence Court in reality because the objective facts revealed a real
life consensus that overwhelmingly mitigated in favor of recognizing Law-
rence's claimed liberty right. Indeed, the Lawrence Court implied that the
Bowers Court should have conducted a more thorough review of the
claimed liberty interest, and that if it had, it would have known that
Hardwick's privacy claim was supported by the American Law Institute
and European law at the time Bowers was decided. 353 In addition, had
the Court investigated the legislative facts supposedly supporting the
Georgia statute, it may have discovered that the nexus between the sod-
omy law and the "ill effects" it sought to prevent may not have survived
even rational basis review, because the facts were, at best, contradic-
tory. 354 The Court's choice to analyze Bowers based on a "cramped"
345. Id. at 206.
346. Id. at 208.
347. Id. at 211.
348. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
349. See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text for more details about Lawrence's
analysis.
350. Bodily integrity was not at stake because the state was not physically intruding into
a human body. Medical and other legislative facts were not discussed, although the Court
alluded to the social fact of discrimination resulting from criminalizing sodomy. See gener-
ally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
351. Id. at 572-73 (cataloging the states that had decriminalized sodomy in 1961 (all 50)
to the time of Bowers decision (24 plus the District of Columbia) to the time of Lawrence
(13)).
352. Id. at 573.
353. See id. at 572-73. See also supra note 157.
354. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 209 n.3 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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reading of the issue and biased rendition of history and tradition pre-
cluded a complete and objective analysis. 355
Liberty rights are too precious to be treated as "seasonal," and should
not depend on whether the Supreme Court has a good year or a
drought.356 It may not be possible to stop the Court from basing an opin-
ion on an inaccurate or biased rendition of history and tradition, which is
precisely why "history and tradition" should be just one of several ele-
ments of liberty analysis, as opposed to the sole criterion.
Conscious or unconscious bias,357 idiosyncratic decision-making, and
judicial "vacillation" might be controlled to some degree by injecting ob-
jective elements into liberty analysis. A multi-factor analytical method
spreads the risk of error by obligating the Court to consider expressly all
relevant legislative facts as well as adjudicative facts and precedent. 358
Elevating the various factors extracted from the Court's precedent to
mandatory elements of liberty interpretation furthers objective "reasoned
judgment" 359 by creating a "reality check" 360 on the Court's liberty
analysis.
The proposed interpretive method should create more coherent and
reliable liberty jurisprudence by imposing an obligation on the Court to
consider a variety of factors and to explain its decisions more fully. Relia-
ble liberty analysis is desirable because it allows people to conduct their
lives according to clear rules.361 Consistent and reliable liberty jurispru-
dence would enhance the Court's credibility and the persuasive value of
355. Id. at 202.
356. Michael H. was decided during the first term that Justice Kennedy was on the
Court; Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote in a number of cases reflecting a conserva-
tive majority and contraction of civil rights. See supra note 19.
357. Unconscious bias is constantly at work for all of us, and manifests in assumptions
and judgments about other people. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1489,1498-1506 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Cate-
gories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1161, 1168-90 (1995); Justin Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Deci-
sionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L. J. 345 (2007); Deana A. Pollard, Uncon-
scious Bias and Self-Critical Analysis: The Case for a Qualified Evidentiary Equal
Employment Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913, 917-25 (1999).
358. See Karst, supra note 256. Legislative facts "transcend the particular dispute and
have relevance to legal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules." David L. Faigman,
"Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV 541, 552 (1991). Legislative facts should be distin-
guished from adjudicative facts, which are the facts particular to the dispute at hand, that
is, the facts decided by the trier of fact. Id. (citing Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (1942)).
359. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973).
360. As stated by Justice Brennan in Michael H., "[wihen and if the Court awakes to
reality, it will find a world very different from the one it expects." Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
491 U.S. 110, 157 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
361. For example, Michael may have made different choices in his relationship with
Carole if he had known that he could be divested of his relationship with Victoria if Carole
decided to stay married to Gerald.
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its rulings,362 and allow Americans to trust the Court's pronouncements
concerning liberty rights. The Court should adopt the test proposed
herein as a check on the inevitable biases of its Members, and to create
more predictable and enduring liberty jurisprudence.
V. TOWARD A CONSISTENT METHOD
FOR LIBERTY ANALYSIS
A. APPLYING THE PROPOSED INTERPRETIVE TEST
To illustrate how the proposed test would operate, proposed legislation
mandating human papilloma virus ("HPV") vaccine for all girls ages
eleven and twelve as a prerequisite to entering the sixth grade in public
schools will be analyzed by reference to the six elements of liberty.363 If a
mandatory HPV vaccine law is passed, it will likely be challenged as a
violation of substantive due process.
The state law challenger should bear the burden of proving that the
liberty interest at stake is "fundamental" by producing evidence of the six
elements proposed herein. This data helps to avoid judicial analysis based
on a rendition of "history and tradition" that is inconsistent with the rele-
vant legislative facts or other elements of the proposed test. The state
presumably will present additional and contradictory evidence to the ex-
tent that it exists. The reviewing court should then describe the nature
and degree of the liberty interest and make findings in support of its char-
acterization by analyzing each of the six elements.
1. History and Tradition
Precedent from prior constitutional rulings, including cases in which
mandatory vaccination and forced medical treatment have been declared
362. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202-203 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) ("The Court's cramped reading of the issue before it makes for a short opinion, but it
does little to make for a persuasive one.").
363. Legislators in forty-one states and the District of Columbia have introduced legis-
lation to require, study, fund, or educate the public about the HPV vaccine. Id. For infor-
mation about HPV presented by the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC"), see CDC,
QUADRIVALENT HUMAN PAPILLOMAVIRUS VACCINE (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwR/
preview/mmwrhtml/rr56e3l2al.htm. See also, e.g., Lindsey Tanner, 1 In 4 Girls Has Sex
Disease, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, March 12, 2008, at Al (discussing HPV and the "heated
debate in Austin" regarding the vaccine). The Michigan Senate was the first to introduce
such legislation, Michigan HPV Mandate Bill Fails; Similar Bill Introduced in Kentucky,
VACCINE ETHICS, Jan. 9, 2007, http://blog.vaccineethics.org/2007/01/michigan-hpv-man-
date-bill-fails-bill.html, in September, 2006, but the bill was not enacted. Ohio's proposed
law also failed in 2006. See HPV Vaccine (Gardasil): A Research Note (April 18, 2007),
http://www.senatorhannon.com/topicslOGardasil.htm. Numerous states have legislation
pending or withdrawn for further study, and many have added "opt out" provisions. NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, HPV Vaccine, Feb. 2008, http://www.ncsl.org/pro-
grams/health/HPVvaccine.htm. In Texas, Governor Rick Perry signed Executive Order 4
on February 2, 2007, mandating that all girls entering sixth grade receive the HPV vaccine,
creating outrage based on his attempt to circumvent the political process, conservative
parents' concerns about the moral message, and financial links between the Governor and
Merck, the manufacturer of the vaccine. Perry's Executive Order was promptly overridden
by House Bill 1098. See Tanner, supra, at Al.
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constitutional, are obvious starting points for characterizing the liberty
infringement involved with mandatory HPV vaccine. For example, Jacob-
son v. Massachusetts is relevant to show the long history of forced vacci-
nation, but may be distinguished by the fact that smallpox cannot be
avoided by personal choices, whereas the cancer-causing types of HPV
inhibited by the vaccine can be avoided by personal choice, such as sexual
abstinence.364 The HPV vaccine therefore implicates personal autonomy,
religion, and self-determination on a different level than the smallpox
vaccine. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health is also relevant to
the right to avoid unwanted medical treatment. However, this case may
be distinguished because the forced medical treatment in Cruzan im-
pacted only the individual receiving treatment, whereas the refusal to ac-
cept the HPV vaccine conceivably could impact an infinite number of
other people, based on the exponential nature of sexual disease prolifera-
tion.365 Precedent concerning the parents' right to control their child's
upbringing should also be considered, since the vaccine unavoidably im-
pacts sex education and the social messages inherent in sexual disease
vaccines. Forced HPV vaccination may violate the parents' educational
and religious prerogatives in child-rearing, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, may expose the child to health risks that the parent and child may
wish to avoid, rendering cases such as Meyer v. Nebraska relevant.
2. The Nature of the Right
Physically invasive sexual disease vaccination impacts personal auton-
omy and intimate choices similar to the nature of the interest infringed in
cases such as Schmerber v. California, Winston v. Lee, Griswold v. Con-
necticut, Roe v. Wade, and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, inter alia. The challenger should carefully describe why
the vaccine constitutes a liberty infringement of fundamental importance
by explaining its impact on personal choice, self-concept, bodily integrity,
sexual autonomy, and religious beliefs. A girl's personal or religious be-
lief in abstinence, for example, would alter the cost-benefit analysis in
terms of medical risks: if the girl is committed to abstinence, her risk of
contracting HPV through sex is non-existent in theory, yet the health
risks of the vaccine remain the same. The state would presumably seek to
prove that its interests outweigh the infringement of personal choice,
since personal choices historically have given way when they adversely
impact public health. In this example, medical and scientific evidence re-
garding the vaccine's efficacy and risks are critical to balance the state's
interest against individual liberty properly.
364. See CDC, supra note 363.




Forced vaccine infringes bodily integrity, based on prior cases in which
the government punctured or otherwise invaded a person's body without
consent, such as Rochin v. California, Schmerber v. California, and Win-
ston v. Lee. The liberty interest is particularly serious if the vaccine has
serious or "unknown" medical risks, 366 as in Winston v. Lee. The state
may counter that the individual medical risks are small relative to the
social costs of not mandating the vaccine if the medical facts support this,
as in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, rendering medical facts critical to the
liberty analysis.
4. State Laws
The challenger should present evidence of similar state laws that have
failed or that are distinguishable such as by having "opt out" provi-
sions.367 If similar laws have been challenged on due process grounds, the
outcome of such challenges should be provided to the court by the party
benefiting from the outcome in prior cases, as persuasive authority that
may demonstrate a growing consensus.
5. Legislative Facts
The most critical element in this example is legislative facts. Medical
and other scientific data pertaining to the efficacy of the vaccine and its
risks are critical to an impartial constitutional analysis. This could include
published medical research and professional opinion by the AMA and
other experts, as well as records from the Food and Drug Administra-
tion's approval of the vaccine. The data should include both the health
risks posed to the individual by the vaccine and the risk HPV poses to
society. Sociological research relating to contemporary sexual practices
and other sexual disease data may help to clarify HPV's risk to society at
large and the urgency of the state's interest.368 This may include data on
youth sexual disease rates and contemporary sexual practices and norms
of which the court may be unaware. Evidence of the efficacy of alternate
methods of preventing the disease should be produced by whichever
party benefits from the data, such as the efficacy (or lack thereof) of edu-
cational programs, or use of protective devices other than vaccine, such as
condoms. 369 Legislative facts should also include the costs of the vaccine
366. Considering that researchers are unsure exactly how many strains of HPV exist, it
seems likely that medical risks are at least somewhat unknown. See Pollard, supra note 365,
at 772-83. See also CDC, supra note 363. Indeed, girls have suffered serious health conse-
quences after being vaccinated with Gardasil, such as seizures and epilepsy. See, e.g., Hil-
ary Hylton, Anti-Vaccine Activists v. Gardasil, TIME, June 19, 2008.
367. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 363 (stating that
most or all of the proposed laws mandating HPV vaccine have opt out provisions).
368. See Pollard, supra note 365, at 772-83 (factual summary of prevalence diseases,
including HPV, and associated costs to society).
369. Unfortunately, some research has shown that condoms do not prevent the spread
of some types of HPV, which may support the state's interest in mandating HPV vaccine.
See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 365, at 777 n.47. However, more recent research indicates that
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and the medical costs of treating persons afflicted with HPV, so that the
court can conduct a cost-benefit analysis with the most accurate economic
data. Medical evidence explaining the state's gender-based vaccine choice
should be produced by the state to show that there are not less discrimi-
natory, gender-neutral means to further its interest in public health.
6. Foreign Law
If foreign law or international human rights treaties have addressed the
issue of mandatory HPV vaccination, the party benefiting from such law
or policies should bring them to the court's attention. This may have lim-
ited persuasive value, however, if sexual disease proliferation in the




Only upon a careful and objective review of all of the elements identi-
fied herein is a court poised to characterize the degree of liberty infringe-
ment and to test the state's interest against the individual's liberty right to
be free from the potentially harmful physical invasion. The individual lib-
erty infringement implicated by the HPV vaccine should be considered
fundamental because it involves many of the types of liberty infringement
that have been declared fundamental in Supreme Court precedent.
Assuming the liberty interest at stake is declared fundamental, a state
may demonstrate a compelling interest if it could show that the HPV epi-
demic has created a serious economic or public safety risk. The state
bears the burden of proof that its chosen means are narrowly tailored to
effectuate its purpose,371 such as by proving that there are not less intru-
sive means of controlling the spread of HPV (for example, means that do
condom use may reduce the risk of infection up to 70%, which supports a challenger's
claim that less invasive alternatives are available. See CDC, supra note 363.
370. Available data indicates that the United States has the highest STD infection rate
in the industrialized world, a rate of 50 to 100 times the rate of other industrialized coun-
tries. See Pollard, supra note 365, at 770 (citing AM. Soc. HEALTH Ass'N, SEXUALLY
TRANSMITIED DISEASES: How MANY CASES AND AT WHAT COST? 10 (Linda L. Alexan-
der et al. eds., 1998), available at http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/1445-std-rep.cfm; Mary
G. Leary, Tort Liability for Sexually Transmitted Disease, in 88 AM. JUR. Trials § 1 (2003).
371. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (articulating strict scrutiny). The
test for whether the state's interest in liberty infringement is sufficient to pass constitu-
tional muster is not clear after Lawrence v. Texas, which did not announce a standard. The
Court has vacillated in terms of how to balance individual rights against state interests
similar to the way it has vacillated among interpretations of liberty. See, e.g., Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (fundamental rights analytical framework (strict scrutiny
or rational basis) employed); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(adopting the "undue burden" test for fundamental right of abortion). Another line of
Supreme Court cases has simply balanced the interests at stake without announcing any
standard of review. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romero, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Mo. Dept. of Health, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). This Article assumes that the liberty interest
involved with mandatory HPV vaccine is fundamental and applies strict scrutiny, although
the analysis would be similar under other standards provided the court considers the ele-
ments proposed herein. The difference would be the strength of nexus required between
the state's means and ends to pass constitutional scrutiny.
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not involve physical risks, like education) or less discriminatory means
(for example, a vaccine for all children, not just girls). If medical experi-
ence and knowledge about HPV and its link to various cancers is un-
clear,372 this may undermine the state's proof of the vaccine's necessity. It
seems unlikely that a state could meet its burden of showing that the
vaccine is necessary if the HPV strains at issue 373 are entirely avoidable
through personal choices such as sexual abstinence or very careful sexual
practices, considering the potential health risks of vaccine and the nature
of its impact on individual liberty. 374 However, if the state includes an
opt-out provision, the preservation of individual autonomy may suffi-
ciently protect personal autonomy to render the law constitutional.
B. THE PROPOSED METHOD IS SUPERIOR To CURRENT ANALYSIS
The proposed liberty test is superior to the current state of liberty juris-
prudence because it limits courts' ability to disregard important legisla-
tive or other facts in analyzing the constitutionality of mandatory HPV
vaccine. For example, under the current law, the Court could pick among
the smorgasbord of tests and choose a one-dimensional analysis of "his-
tory and tradition" as it did in Michael H. and Bowers. That is, the Court
could simply make a finding that mandatory vaccine for school children
has always been the law of the land, that states are in the best position to
determine what is necessary for public health, and therefore, that con-
cerns about federalism and separation of powers militates against second-
guessing the state's decision to mandate the HPV vaccine. Or, the Court
could rely on certain results-oriented legislative facts, such as the high
rate of sexual disease transmission in the United States and the extraordi-
nary medical costs and personal suffering that results from contracting
HPV, and defer to the state to make the cost-benefit analysis (similar to
the way it characterized the issue in Bowers, then deferred to Georgia's
"morality" justification). The Court conceivably could ignore all medical
evidence of the efficacy of the vaccine and potential health risks in the
same way that it summarily dismissed the experts' opinions in Michael H.
It can be dangerous for courts to defer to states when liberty interests
are at stake, as courts offer individuals the only source of prompt protec-
tion from legislative overreaching. State action may appear public health-
oriented, but may mask a less respectable motive. 375 Adopting the pro-
372. See Pollard, supra note 365, at 776-77 (noting that researchers believe that at least
thirty strains of HPV exist, only a few of which cause serious harm, including cancer; re-
search is continuing).
373. There are at least thirty strains of the human papilloma virus (HPV), some of
which cause cancer. Id. at 776-77. The more recent consensus of the experts at the CDC is
that approximately 100 types have been identified, forty of which infect the genital area.
See CDC, supra note 363.
374. Contracting a disease, and even death, are known risks of vaccination. See, e.g.,
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
375. Indeed, the first "mandate" for HPV vaccine of elementary school girls was made
by way of Executive Order of Texas Governor Rick Perry, who had financial ties to the
vaccine's manufacturer, Merck. Liz Austin Peterson, Perry's Staff Discussed Vaccine on
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posed test would prevent courts from disregarding critical medical or
other facts in a "willy-nilly" fashion. The Court should adopt a multi-
factor liberty test to instruct all lower courts that when a law impinges on
liberty, the law must be analyzed carefully and with regard to all scientific
and other relevant evidence identified as elements in this Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
Liberty is a cornerstone of American democracy, and far too important
to be relegated to unpredictable and unstable judicial interpretation. Cur-
rent liberty doctrine is undesirable because a variety of interpretive meth-
odologies are engaged in an ad hoc manner, some of which do not require
principled decision-making by reference to any concrete or objective
standards, rendering liberty analysis vulnerable to purely subjective and
biased judicial interpretation. This Article argues that a more principled
liberty method of review is possible and consistent with a century of Su-
preme Court precedent. The Supreme Court should eliminate the present
lack of predictability and consistency in liberty interpretation by adopting
a more scientific method of review. The Court should adopt a multi-di-
mensional interpretive method, such as the six factor test proposed
herein, to limit subjective value judgments in liberty interpretation and to
create more predictable, principled, and enduring liberty jurisprudence.
Day Merck Donated to Campaign, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Feb. 22, 2007, availa-
ble at http://www.statesman.com/news/content/regionllegislature/stories/l1/
2 2/ 2 2 perry.
html. The Texas Legislature reacted swiftly and thwarted the governor's actions, but the
issue will likely come before a federal district court at some point due to pending legisla-
tion. See, e.g., Alliance for Human Research Protection, Merck Payola Pays Off: Texas
Governor Orders STD Vaccine for ALL Girls, Feb. 3, 2007, available at http://www.ahrp.
orglcms/contentview455/28/; Texas Governor Orders STD Vaccine for All Girls, MSNBC,
Feb. 3, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16948093/from/RS.
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